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This paper documents the recent performance of European electronic purses.
It presents data on 16 such schemes, and compares their penetration and usage
rates. These rates are shown to differ substantially. A number of schemes are
doing increasingly well and in all probability are here to stay. These schemes
have also received a boost from the introduction of the euro. But a number of
other schemes are making little or no headway. Some have even experienced
a relapse and appear to be on the verge of disappearance. The paper tries to
identify explanations for these disparate fates.
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In an article published in July 2000 (Van Hove, 2000), I presented data on the
penetration and usage rates of 12 European electronic purse systems. The
results clearly showed that in general e-purse projects had failed to live up to
expectations. In a June 2000 lecture. Otmar Issing, Member of the Executive
Board and chief economist of the European Central Bank, also concluded that
“in most [euro area] countries, the use of stored value cards [was] still at
a relatively experimental stage” (Issing, 2000, p. 9). However, Issing also
pointed out that in view of the network effects both on the demand and the
supply side, “the fact that the use of electronic money [was] not widespread up
to [that] date [did] not imply that arapid growth of this payment medium might
not take place at some stage” (op. cit., p. 10). Many observers and e-purse
operators were hoping that such arapid growth would – enfin– be triggered by
the introduction of the euro banknotes and coins on January 1, 2002. Some
even argued that it might be a ‘make or break’moment: “If European e-purses
cannot make a definitive breakthrough now, then when?” (Van Hove, 2002).
Newspaper reports suggest that at least some of the European purses did
indeed enjoy a ‘euro-bounce’ following the launch of the common currency.
The aggregated statistics maintained by the ECB point in the same direction:
they show a jump in the value of electronic money in circulation in the
euro-zone from 170 million EUR in November 2001 via 208 million EUR in
December 2001 – on the eve of the introduction of the euro – to 240 million
EUR in January 2002
1. The overall amount of e-money in circulation has
continued to increase afterwards, but only gradually: the figure for October
2003 is 272 million EUR.
This paper tries to document the recent performance of European e-purses in
a more systematic and detailed way. It presents data on 16 such schemes and
concentrates on the period April 1995 – September/October 2002
2,3.
9
1 Source: European Central Bank, Euro-denominated electronic money in circulation in the
euro area, December 2003 <http://www.ecb.int/stats/mb/emoney/emoney.pdf>.
2 In doing so, the paper builds on the data presented in Van Hove (2000), which were
supplemented and updated based on the ECB ‘Blue Book’; the BIS ‘Red Book’; the latest ‘Survey
of Electronic Money Developments’ (CPSS, 2001); annual reports, press releases, and web sites
of e-purse operators; annual reports of central banks; and news reports. However, the bulk of the
data was obtained directly from e-purse operators or central banks (see acknowledgements). Not
all operators have been equally open but only Sistema 4B refused cooperation. As a result I have
no recent data at all for the Monedero 4B scheme.
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across countries. After an introductory Section that explains the concept
behind electronic purses, Sections 3 and 4 first present data on the number of
cards in circulation and the number of terminals. Section 5 then analyses
actual usage that is made of this infrastructure. Section 6 presents two
summary measures of the state of the respective e-purse schemes; namely, the
float and the number of transactions per capita. Section 7 concludes by
pointing out the likely long-run winners and losers, and by offering tentative
explanations for their disparate fates.
An important preliminary note is that the schemes surveyed were launched at
widely diverging dates, and are thus today at different points in their life
cycle. Therefore, for some of the graphs
4, two versions are presented in an
attempt to make the figures more comparable: one version with a normal time
axis and a second one with on the horizontal axis the number of months since
roll-out
5. Note also that the main text concentrates on general observations.
Additional remarks on the evolution of individual schemes can be found in
Appendix 2.
10 Introduction
3 Note that for some schemes I have more recent data (up to December 2003). Although not
visible in the graphs with a normal time axis, these data will typically show up in the second
version of the graphs (see below).
4 The working paper version, which is available from the author, contains more of these
graphs.
5 This is not always straightforward to determine. In most cases I have taken as the date of
roll-out the date at which the scheme was expanded beyond the pilot region. This does not
necessarily mean that cards and terminals became available on a nation-wide scale at that point in
time. Appendix 2 lists the roll-out dates of all the schemes.
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The Glossary of Terms Used in Payments and Settlement Systems of the Bank
for International Settlements defines an electronic purse as follows:
“a reloadable multipurpose prepaid card which may be used for small retail
or other payments instead of coins” (CPSS, 2003, p. 22). Although in practice
e-purses are also surrogates for smaller banknotes, the rationale behind their
introduction – from the mid 1990s onwards (see Appendix 2) – was indeed to
provide consumers and merchants with an electronic payment instrument that
could handle small transactions cost effectively. Debit cards failed in this
respect because in most countries they functioned in on-line mode, implying
that they require a real-time connection with a central computer, which made
them too costly for smaller payments. As a result, debit cards had made little
or no inroads in entire sectors of the economy which were still dominated by
cash – a costly payment instrument for banks.
The crucial difference between debit cards and e-purses is that the latter work
off-line: they only require a ‘conversation’between the card and the terminal
of the merchant. The absence of telecommunication costs, the cheaper
terminals, and the lower commissions compared to debit cards would – at
least that was the conviction of e-purse operators and issuers – make e-purse
technology an attractive alternative to cash, particularly for merchants for
whom debit cards were no option.
E-purses were thus primarily positioned as a substitute for coins and
banknotes. The question then is: what exactly are the advantages of e-purses
over cash, both for consumers and merchants? Starting with consumers, let
me first stress that compared to debit cards, e-purses have obvious
disadvantages – they must be reloaded periodically, there is the risk of loss
and theft, users must keep track of the balance on their cards, and they lose
the float on their money – while the advantages – no PIN is required – appear
minor
6. However, as mentioned, e-purses should not be compared to debit
cards, but to cash. Compared to cash, all the above disadvantages cancel out.
At the same time – or so e-purse operators claim – e-purses can offer
important improvements over cash. The magic word in marketing campaigns
is increased convenience. Leaflets emphasise that e-purse users always have
11
6 Note that this comparison omits the advantage that, given their off-line nature, e-purses can
be used in places where credit and debit cards are not usually accepted.
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walk around with a heavy and bulky wallet full of coins. Surveys point out
that consumers see the added value of this, particularly in unattended
applications (such as pay phones, vending machines, parking meters and
transit systems) because these are the uses for which cash is truly
inconvenient. Another possible improvement over cash is the ability to reload
the card at home – using a PC or a smart phone – as this saves cardholders
time-consuming trips to an ATM. However, this requires an additional
investment on the part of the cardholder.
Turning to merchants, the advantages held out by e-purse operators are
typically the following: improved security, greater earned float, fewer
transaction errors, speedier transactions, and lower cash handling costs.
However, a problem for the promoters of e-purses is that merchants may see
few immediate benefits from e-purse acceptance. This is because the marginal
cost of a cash transaction is low, given the importance of fixed costs. This
implies that a merchant’s total costs of handling conventional cash will not
decrease linearly with the relative share of cash transactions. For example,
cash handling costs are linked to a certain extent to the frequency of trips to
the bank rather than to the quantity of cash being transported. In other words,
it is difficult to find substantial savings in displacing some cash. For the
merchants, then, the reality is that accepting e-purses may initially add to
costs. Another remark is that many of the costs related to cash (such as
counting the cash receipts at the end of the day and bringing them to the bank)
are internal costs which do not (necessarily) involve a cash outlay and are
therefore less visible. This may help explain the feeling amongst certain
merchants that the cost savings held out by e-purses are limited compared to
the required investment, particularly when a reduction of the check-out time
is not judged to be of prime importance in their sector. On the other hand,
there are obviously sectors where payments are particularly time-critical
(public transport), where cash handling costs are particularly high (vending
machines), or where vandalism is a major problem (parking meters,
payphones).
12 Electronic purses: quid?
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Starting our overview of e-purse data, Figure 1 presents data on the total
number of cards in circulation as a percentage of population. For most
schemes this is, however, not a good indicator of their real degree of
penetration. This is because in many countries – in Austria, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, to name but a few – e-purses were simply incorporated into debit
cards and sent out to cardholders when their debit cards came up for renewal.
As a result, in these countries the number of purses in circulation increased
steadily. However, as is shown below, many of the unsolicited purses
typically remained unused so that the real degree of penetration is
substantially lower. As a result, Figure 1 primarily indicates how hard
operators, riding on the waves of card renewal, have tried to put cards into the
wallets of cardholders – and little more than that.
This said, the figure does yield a number of interesting observations. First of
all it shows that in several countries the availability of cards clearly has not
been the bottleneck these past couple of years. In the Netherlands, Belgium,
Luxembourg, Germany
7, and Austria, penetration rates as high as 80% to
100% (and in some cases even higher) have been reached. As a result, in these
countries maximum coverage has more or less been attained, and growth rates
have subsequently been levelling off recently
8.
At the same time, in a number of other countries e-purses are even today only
of limited (in some countries: regional) importance. This is true for Italy,
France, Finland, and Spain – but the prospects differ. In Italy, the MINIpay
scheme has seen virtually no expansion between 2000 and now, neither
geographically nor in terms of the number of cards. In France, banks and
other players were slow to reach an agreement on the technology to use and
the Moneo purse has been rolled out in large numbers only fairly recently. At
13
7 There is considerable uncertainty concerning the total number of GeldKarte cards in
circulation. According to some sources, notably the Bundesbank, there were some 67 million cards
in circulation at end-2001; other sources usually make mention of 50 to 55 million. For reasons of
consistency, I have used the Bundesbank figures – which yield a penetration rate of 82%.
However, if one uses the alternative figures, one arrives at a penetration rate of only 61–67%.
Recent market research by InterCard underpins the alternative figures: they find that only 68% of
the 85.3 ec cards in circulation in February 2003 were equipped with a chip, which corresponds
to 57.9 million. InterCard notes that the banks have thus clearly not met their target to equip all ec
cards with a chip by the end of 2002. For the future InterCard thinks that the chip penetration
might decrease as cost awareness amongst German banks is on the increase (Source: InterCard,
Chip-Ausstattung der ec-Bankkarten fällt auf unter 70%, press release, April 2, 2003).
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developed
9. The group with the most members was the Société Européenne
de Monnaie Electronique (SEME). SEME’s seven member banks launched
a pilot of their GeldKarte-based Moneo purse in the city of Tours in October
1999. SEME primarily targeted retail point-of-sale terminals, but also wanted
to gain acceptance for its cards in buses, parking meters and vending
machines. The same month SEME began its Moneo test, a Mondex pilot was
launched in Strasbourg by Mondex France, a company 51%-owned by Crédit
Mutuel. Crédit Mutuel is France’s second largest debit and credit card issuer
– and, curiously, a member of SEME. Things became even more complicated
when a third purse called Modeus entered the fray. Modeus was backed by
four financial institutions (including La Poste, the national post office) and
two transit authorities (SNCF and RATP, respectively the French railways and
the Paris mass-transit system). The aim of this group was to test whether
a transport ticket application and an e-purse application could co-exist on the
same card. Importantly, Modeus’intention was to make its purse contactless.
Fortunately, in July 2000 SEME and Modeus merged and created a new entity
– aptly titled Billetique Monétique Services (BMS) – with an equal number
of shareholders from both groups
10. The new entity committed itself to
pursuing the deployment of the contact Moneo e-purse across France as its
first priority. And eventually Crédit Mutuel also settled for Moneo. Crédit
Mutuel launched Moneo in Strasbourg at the beginning of the second
14 Cards
8 This said, in Germany there does still appear to be room for further growth (see also the
previous footnote). This is because not all German banks have been equally active in promoting
the GeldKarte. The co-operative banks, represented by BVR, have for example added the e-purse
to almost all their ec cards. The Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe, the group of more than 500 savings
banks, has also been an active promoter (Source: “EMV migration may boost GeldKarte’s case”,
epaynews.com, July 5, 2002 <http://www.epaynews.com>). Together, savings and co-operative
banks control more than 90% of the GeldKarte cards issued and they have a disproportionate share
in the volume of GeldKarte payments (Source: ePaymentsnews, Geldkarte e-purse grows in usage
and sophistication, ePaymentsnews Review, No. 6, December 2002). The private banks, for their
part, have been far less active. The Hypovereinsbank, the second largest private bank in Germany
(with 8.5 million clients), has for one never offered the GeldKarte (Rallu, 2002, p. 21). The
Dresdner Bank, for its part, decided to stop issuing the GeldKarte in June 2002 because of weak
demand (Source: “Dresdner Bank schafft Geldkarte ab”, Heise online, June 4, 2002
<http://www.heise.de>). Unlike the savings banks, the Dresdner Bank did not automatically
include the e-purse function on its debit cards. And only some 55,000 customers out of 1.8 million
holders of an ec card explicitly asked for it to be mounted on their cards – and paid 2.50 euro for
the privilege. Finally, while the Deutsche Bank 24 (with 7.4 million clients) continues to back the
GeldKarte, since the start of 2002 Deutsche Bank 24 only offers it as a separate card (Rallu, op.
cit.). Recent research by InterCard mentioned in the previous footnote confirms this analysis:
co-operative bank have equipped 95% of their cards with a chip, compared to 76% for the savings
banks, and a meager 14% for the private banks.
9 Card Technology, France no longer lacks an e-purse; it now has three, Card Technology News
Bulletin, December 13, 1999.
10 Groupement Cartes Bancaires, E-purse: Moneo and Modeus merge, dossier, 2000.
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disappeared completely, making Moneo the only ‘universal’ e-purse scheme
in France (BMS, 2002a, p. 6)
11.
When interpreting Figure 1, it is important to realize that Moneo has been
launched progressively, with banks acquiring local merchants as well as
installing loading terminals before launching the service with consumers in
a particular region or city (op. cit.). After being tested in Tours for more than
a year, Moneo was first extended to Brest, Morlaix and Quimper (in
November 2000). In 2001, the scheme was rolled out in additional regions
and major cities (including, for example, Bordeaux, Lyon, and the whole of
Brittany), so that at the end of 2001 10% of the territory was covered. In 2002,
yet more regions and cities were added, leading up to the launch in the Paris
market in November. In June 2002, and owing in part to the boost from the
euro, BMS decided to accelerate by one year the introduction of Moneo, and
to achieve national coverage by the end of 2003 instead of 2004 (op. cit.). The
target for end 2002 became 60% of the territory
12. Also important when
interpreting the Figure is that (only) in October 2001 French banks began
including the purse on most of their new and replacement debit cards. By June
2002 about 7 million of these combined CB-and-Moneo cards (on a total of
40 million) had been issued. The target for end 2002 was 16 million; for end
2003 it was 32 million. It is unclear whether these targets have been met.
In Finland, another country of our ‘laggards’group, targets such as these have
been continuously revised downward in recent years. In March 1997, the
target was to have 3 million Avant-enabled bank cards in circulation by the
end of 1999. This subsequently became the target for 2003, there being only
some 800,000 cards in circulation as at mid-2002
13. According to Jyri
Marviala, Marketing Manager at Avant operator Automatia Rahakortit, the
explanation for the delay is “the time-shift in the overall technical
change-over to chip cards. One could say, that all the time the target curve has
remained practically the same, depicting a mass changeover within
a three-year period, but the three ‘big’ years have been postponed later and
later. We have followed the shift in the expected time schedule of EMV
change-over, as we have no stand-alone purse cards, but are ‘piggy-backing’
Cards 15
11 Strohl, G., Moneo arrive en Alsace, Strasbourg Infos, June 8, 2003
<http://www.strasmag.com/infos_stras/ moneo.htm>.
12 Judging from a July 2003 press release (BMS, 2003) these targets will have been met.
13 Source: Avant web site at <http://www.avant.fi/newsine.html>. This would imply that
“a majority of the cards issued by banks in Finland will have the Avant electronic cash
functionality by the end of 2003” (op. cit.). The target for 2005 is 5 million.
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deadline’ should ensure that the targets hold (more or less ...)”
14. Turning to
Spain, none of the three schemes seems to have made much progress. But
then according to the SmartEuro report, only the Visa Cash scheme targets the
“general audience” (2000, p. 45). The Monedero 4B purse is limited to “small
closed projects”, and Euro 6000 concentrates on “local projects of Saving
Banks supported with value added applications on the same card” (ibidem).
At the end of 2001, the combined penetration rate of the Spanish e-purse
schemes amounted to 25% (down from 26% in 2000)
15.
A third – and final – general observation concerning Figure 1 is that some
schemes were quicker than others to put purse-enabled cards in the market;
see especially Figure 1b. This is crucial in view of the all-important network
externalities and the resulting chicken-and-egg deadlock. The latter implies
that merchants will be reluctant to invest in new terminals needed to accept
payments unless sufficient consumers show their interest, while consumers
will not use the new means of payment as long as they can only pay with it in
a limited number of places (Van Hove, 1999a). In order to break this
deadlock, e-purse operators need to attract a critical mass of merchants who
accept the new payment cards and/or cardholders who use their cards. And
providing cardholders with purse-enabled cards is obviously a prerequisite for
having sufficient active cards. Hence, a relatively fast and massive
deployment of cards appears advisable.
Figure 1b shows that especially the Luxembourg miniCASH scheme, which
was launched in February-March 1999, reached a high level of card
penetration extremely fast. As it happened, every Bancomat card (the local
debit card) in the Grand Duchy was due for renewal at the end of 1998
16. The
Austrian, Dutch, and German banks were also quick in putting e-purses into
the hands of cardholders. In Austria, for example, this was because at the end
of 1995 – so 10 months prior to the full-scale roll-out of Quick in October
1996 – all 2.5 million eurocheque cards had to be renewed anyhow, and it was
therefore decided to directly equip them with a chip
17. Judged by this
16 Cards
14 Source: Marviala, J., personal e-mail, August 20, 2002. The March 2002 Annual Report of
the Finnish Bankers’ Association confirms that the “introduction of the smart cards did not
proceed in line with the schedules banks had prepared in 2002” (p. 29).
15 Source: own calculations based on data taken from the ECB ‘Blue Book’.
16 Source: James, C., miniCASH: pioneering role for Luxembourg’s electronic purse,
Business, No. 117, February 1999 <http://www.cetrel.lu/infos/DetailPresse.html$131>.
17 Source: Judt, E., Quick – die elektronische Geldbörse in Österreich, cards Karten cartes,
Heft 4, November 1996, p. 34-37.
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like Moneo in France, the Proton card was introduced across Belgium in
phases – city by city – and it took Banksys more than two years to cover the
whole of the country. In the absence of a ‘big bang’, what matters is not so
much the overall penetration rate but rather the penetration rate in the regions
that have already been covered – which is something that cannot be inferred
from Figure 1b.
As was already pointed out, in countries where issuers flooded the market
with unsolicited cards, many remained unused. The number of active cards is
therefore a more reliable indicator of card penetration. A problem here is that
e-purse operators use widely diverging definitions – with some of them using
more than one. The concepts that are used range from ‘cards loaded at least
once since issuance’ (Avant, CASH in Sweden, Euro 6000, miniCASH,
MINIpay, Proton in the early years, Quick), via ‘cards with a non-zero
balance’ (Cash in Switzerland, MEP, Moneo), ‘cards loaded at least once in
the previous 12 months’ (Monedero 4B), all the way to ‘cards used at least
once in the previous 6 months’(Proton, Euro 6000), ‘cards used at least once
in the previous 3 months’(Moneo), and ‘cards used at least once in the current
month’ (GeldKarte, MEP)
18. Since the first three definitions concentrate on
whether the cards are or have been charged (rather than used for payments),
I have grouped such statistics in Figure 2, under the term activated cards.
Statistics that comply with the latter three definitions are presented in
Figure 3, under active cards.
Starting with Figure 2, a first observation is that I have far less data compared
to Figure 1 – for the simple reason that e-purse operators are considerably less
open when it comes to releasing data on the number of activated (or active)
cards, rather than just the total number of cards issued. Part of the explanation
for this may lie in the fact that the data are simply less flattering: the degree
of penetration invariably lies significantly lower when gauged in terms of the
number of activated cards. Asalient example is the Swedish CASH card – for
which the penetration rate drops from about 50% to a mere 6%. But similar
remarks can be made for just about any scheme. Tellingly, in a survey
commissioned by the Austrian central bank and conducted in the fourth
quarter of 2001 (Mooslechner et al., 2002, p. 96 and 98), only 22% of
respondents stated that they possessed a card with a Quick e-purse
Cards 17
18 In the case of the GeldKarte, ‘used’ means that the card has either been loaded or used for
payment at least once during the month in question; the Proton figures only take into account
purchase transactions.
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high (see Figure 1a)
19. There thus appears to be a problem of awareness
– which is obviously by no means proper to Austria
20.
In fact, only Proton and miniCASH can boast satisfactory penetration rates
– with Proton towering way above the other schemes
21. The only observation
that I have for the Netherlands relates to the combined penetration rate of
Chipknip and Chipper
22. When concentrating on the evolution over time,
a positive note is that the penetration rate of most schemes has been
increasing consistently – with three exceptions. First, the Italian MINIpay
scheme has been virtually stagnating – at a very low level. Second – and this
is quite alarming – the number of activated CASH cards has been dropping
since December 2000. The third and worst case is the Multibanco purse in
Portugal, where the number of cards with a positive balance has been
dropping since the beginning of 1999. In December 1998 there were still
411,000 activated MEP cards; by December 2001 this had dropped to
119,000. And in July 2002 that figure dropped to a mere 4,000 cards, because
cards that were still functioning in PTE were removed from the statistics
23.
The scheme has thus de facto all but disappeared. A final interesting
observation is that the penetration rate of the Swiss Cash purse is higher than
that of the Austrian Quick purse, even though the overall penetration rate of
the former is lower. Part of the explanation is that the Swiss Post Office
– which has a market share of 37% in the debit card market – decided not to
include the Cash purse on its debit card, but to issue a separate card for which
customers have to apply (and pay!)
24. On the one hand, this result in a lower
18 Cards
19 Moreover, Mooslechner et al. point out that while the total number of Quick cards in
circulation has increased constantly, revealed Quick ownership has remained fairly constant over
time – the figure for Q1 1997 being 15%, for example. From this they conclude that “the survey
results signal that people were becoming less informed relative to the number of cards issued”
(Mooslechner et al., 2002, p. 98).
20 Even in Luxembourg, where the miniCASH purse is doing relatively well, this was the case.
In a survey conducted in early 2001, 48% of respondents stated that they possessed an e-purse
(Colson and Havé, 2002, p. 11), whereas the actual penetration rate at that time was roughly 70%.
And in a survey conducted in the Netherlands in January 2003, almost one third of respondents
said that they did not have a Chipknip (Source: Interpay, Chippen, een kwestie van bewustzijn,
Betaalwijzer, Nr. 2, July 2003, p. 7).
21 Some caution is required concerning the two most recent observations for Proton since these
were not obtained directly from Banksys. The sources are SmartEuro (2000) and ECR (2000b,
p. 8), respectively. I have been unable to get these figures confirmed by Banksys.
22 Cf. “At the end of 2001, more than 22 million prepaid cards were circulating, 6 million of
which were loaded, ...” (De Nederlandsche Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, March 2002, p. 25). The
definition used is ‘cards loaded at least once’(Source: Kieviet, R., personal e-mail, April 9, 2002).
23 Source: Hipólito, P., personal e-mail, December 20, 2002.
24 See the notes to Figure 1 in Appendix 2 for more information.
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relatively less sleeping cards: the ‘activation rate’of the Postcard Cash purses
is significantly higher than that of the bank-issued purses (respectively 35%
and 8% in October 2002). Still, the Postcard Cash purses only account for
some 6% of the total number of activated cards. The second part of the
explanation is that the activation rate of the bank-issued purses is also slightly
higher in Switzerland than in Austria.
Turning to Figure 3, which depicts the ratio of active cards to total population,
there is an obvious difference in level between Proton on the one hand and
GeldKarte and MEP on the other hand – although one should take into
account that Banksys’ definition of ‘active’ is less strict (cf. supra). Interpay
does not release any data on active cards but according to a (reliable) industry
source about 10% of the Chipknip cards in circulation were active at end
– January 2003 (same definition as GeldKarte and MEP). This would imply
that some 10% of the Dutch population were active Chipknip users at that
point in time. According to Pierre Fersztand, CEO of BMS, 78% of activated
cards were in active use in spring 2002 (that is, were used at least once in the
previous 3 months)
25. This would boil down to a penetration rate of almost
12% in April 2002.
Where the evolution in the number of active Proton cards is concerned, it is
particularly interesting to see that there was a jump of some 700,000 cards
between December 2001 and January 2002 – clearly on account of the euro.
To repeat, the definition used here is ‘cards used for at least one purchase
transaction in the last 6 months’. The number of active Proton cards continued
to increase until June 2002 (when an all time high of 28% of the population
was reached), and gradually dropped afterwards. However, the level at
end-March 2003 (23%) is still higher than the level at end-2001 (18%). I have
no post-euro data for the GeldKarte, but in a November 2002 article Andreas
Koebe, sales manager for S-Card Service, the payment card services and
marketing unit of Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe, is quoted saying that still “only
about 2% or 3% of GeldKarte cardholders are active purse users” (Card
Technology, 2002, p. 9). Given that the value that I have for December 2001
is 1% to 1.5%
26, this seems to indicate that there might also have been a euro
Cards 19
25 Source: Fédération Bancaire Française, “Trois questions à Pierre Fersztand”, Actualité
Bancaire, Nr. 466, May 22, 2002.
26 Depending on the figure used for the total number of GeldKarte cards in circulation; see
footnote 6.
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27. Finally, where Austria is concerned,
the regular payment card survey conducted by the Oesterreichische
Nationalbank provides some indication of active Quick users. As mentioned,
only 22% of respondents stated that they owned a card with a Quick e-purse
application. Of these, 54% never use the purse function, 9% say they use it
“several times a week”, 11% “about once a week”, 12% “at least once
a month”, and another 12% use it “less than once a month” (Mooslechner et
al., 2002, p. 98, Table 1). If one adds up the first three user categories (and
thus uses the same definition as for GeldKarte and MEP), active users total
32% of self-declared owners – which is equivalent to some 7% of the
respondents.
20 Cards
27 Another recent article states that “only 5% of cards are actually in use” (Source:
ePaymentsnews, Geldkarte e-purse grows in usage and sophistication, ePaymentsnews Review,
No. 6, December 2002).
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Figure 4 presents data on that other part of the infrastructure of an electronic
purse scheme: terminals. A first interesting observation is that there are three
schemes that almost consistently outperform Proton – the scheme that proved
to be the most successful overall in Van Hove (2000) and that I therefore use
as a benchmark throughout this paper. For one, the increase in the number of
miniCASH terminals has been quite spectacular, especially if one takes into
account that the miniCASH purse was launched almost three years later than
Proton. The number of Chipknip terminals has also increased faster compared
to Proton – except, that is, in recent periods. However, a significant portion of
the Chipknip acceptance points are so-called ‘combi terminals’ – terminals
that accept both debit cards and e-purses
28. As will be shown below,
merchants who already accept debit cards are not really part of the core
market of an e-purse, and such acceptance points do not generate high
transaction volumes. Finally, it comes as a surprise that the Portuguese MEP
scheme is among the high-flyers in terms of terminals. As was documented in
the previous Section, cardholders have been deserting the scheme since early
1999 and recently it has imploded completely. In such a setting, one would
not expect to see new merchants joining the scheme
29. The explanation is that
the recent increase in the number of MEP terminals is basically a mirage




28 In early 2001 some three quarters of the Chipknip terminals were combi terminals (De
Nederlandsche Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, March 2001, p. 25). In a 2002 memorandum Jaap
Akkermans states that “almost 100% of the Dutch POS-terminal base accepts Chipknip”
(Akkermans, J. memorandum, December 2, 2002). Part of the explanation for this is the agreement
made in 1999 that POS terminal owners would not have to pay monthly subscription fees (de Vries
and Nielen, 2001, p. 13). Judging from a presentation by Antoon Kuijpers of Interpay, in March
2003 only some 15% of the Chipknip terminals were Chipknip-only terminals (Source, Kuijpers,
A., Ontwikkelingen in het betalingsverkeer, presentatie, Expert meetings betalingsverkeer,
Hoofddorp, April 1, 2003).
29 I have not succeeded in obtaining an explanation for the jump in the number of terminals
between March and April 2000.
30 Source: Hipólito, P., personal e-mail, December 20, 2002. I have no recent figures
concerning the relative importance of purse-only terminals. However, by the end of 1998 there
were only “about 16 thousand off-line PMB terminals” out of a total of more than 53,000 (Source:
SIBS web site, consulted on March 7, 2000), which corresponds to 30%. Experience shows that
combi terminals do not generate high transaction volumes. According to the SIBS annual report
for 2000, U-POS accounted for about 70% of MEP transactions and portable terminals for more
than 25%. The remainder – a mere 5% – took place at debit card POS terminals that also accepted
MEP. According to the report, an important explanation for these figures are ‘MEP-only
environments’ in companies (Source: SIBS, Relatório e Contas 2000 <http://www.sibs.pt/).
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Proton terminals between December 2001 and January 2002. Apparently, fear
for a ‘cash crash’in the first weeks after the euro launch prompted additional
retailers to start accepting e-purses. This may also have been the case in
Austria, but since I have no data for January 2002 it is difficult to tell.
Interestingly, a number of other schemes have experienced a negative euro
impact. In Spain, for example, since the introduction of the euro Visa Cash is
no longer accepted in Teléfonica’s roughly 90,000 public telephones
(Carnero, 2002a). According to Carmen Carnero, general deputy manager
Visa España/SERMEPA, “Teléfonica was experiencing a massive decrease in
the revenues obtained from their public telephones due to the phenomenal
take off of mobile phones”. It was therefore “agreed that there was no
business case for any of the parties [in adapting] the domestic electronic purse
to the euro”. Infrastructure upgrades will be made directly for CEPS
technology
31. For much the same reason, most Avant-accepting pay phones
did not survive the introduction of the euro either, resulting in a slight drop in
the total number of terminals. According to Jyri Marviala, “the downscaling
trend in payphone networks has been continuing for several years since the
‘mobile revolution’, but only became so abrupt due to the cost that the euro
change-over would have imposed”
32.
Other schemes that have not been doing particularly well – but for reasons
unrelated to the euro – are the Swedish CASH scheme and Danmønt in
Denmark. The number of CASH terminals at the end of 2002 was lower than
at the end of 1999. Danmønt, for its part, suffered a blow when TeleDanmark
(now TDC) stopped accepting Danmønt in its payphones network as of
January 1, 2001 (ECR, 2000a). However, according to Pernille Kylling of
PBS, “mobile phones had minimized this market” anyhow
33. Back in 2000,
there were fears that the Copenhagen metro system might follow
TeleDanmark’s example (ECR, 2000b), but according to Kylling the
Danmønt card is still accepted at ticket vending machines in train stations.
Figure 4 also shows that while it is increasing, the number of GeldKarte
terminals is still clearly too low. To end this Section on a positive note, let me
mention that until May 2003 – the final month for which I have data for
Moneo – Moneo’s speed of deployment was almost identical to that of Proton
at a comparable point in time.
22 Terminals
31 Source: Carnero, C., personal e-mail, September 12, 2002.
32 Source: Marviala, J., personal e-mail, August 20, 2002.
33 Source: Kylling, P., personal e-mail, August 22, 2002.
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Now that I have described the e-purse infrastructure that is in place in the
respective countries, let me proceed with an analysis of actual usage that is
made of this infrastructure. Figure 5 shows that if one uses the number of
transactions per issued card as a yardstick, the overall level is extremely low.
Only Proton has succeeded in breaching the barrier of 1 transaction per card
per month – and this only recently
34. However, after the discussion in Section
3 it should be clear that the low overall frequencies of use reflect the
importance of sleeping cards more than anything else. It is therefore better to
look at the frequencies of use per activated card as is done in Figure 6. Still,
Figure 5 does show ‘euro-bounces’ in the usage rates of the Proton,
miniCASH, and Chipknip cards (respectively from 0.8 to 1.2, from 0.4 to 0.7,
and from 0.15 to 0.25 transactions per card per month). The Quick card in
Austria also enjoyed a euro-bounce but this is less clear in the graph because
I have no observation for January 2002. It is, however, visible in Figure 8a.
Note also that the usage rate of the Swiss Cash card – which obviously could
not benefit from the introduction of the euro – is relatively high: it is
comparable to that of the Chipknip card, and higher than that of the Quick
purse. Part of the explanation lies in the lower proportion of sleeping cards
(see Section 3). Given the dramatic fall in the number of activated (and
active) MEPpurses documented in Section 3, the slide in its overall frequency
of use should come as no surprise. A similar remark can be made for the
Swedish CASH card. In view of the low number of terminals the low usage
rate of the GeldKarte is also hardly surprising. The Italian and Spanish
schemes are doing even worse. On the other hand, the usage rate of the
Moneo card – the latest addition to the pack – appears to hold promises for
the future.
Figure 6 gives frequencies of use per activated card – which are by definition
higher than those in Figure 5. When looking at the post-euro usage rates, it is
striking that there are two distinct clusters: one with purses that are doing
relatively well, and a second comprising the rest. miniCASH, Cash in
23
34 Note that the Proton figures for May-November 1996 are still strongly influenced by the
cards that had been in use for more than a year in the pilot cities of Louvain and Wavre. In April
1996, the final month of the pilot, the frequency of use amounted to 2.1. The abrupt drop in the
frequency of use in December 1996 is caused by a typical end-of-year jump in the number of debit
cards that come up for renewal.
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ranging from 3.0 to 4.3. Usage rates in the second cluster are close to 1 (MEP)
or significantly below 1 (Euro 6000, CASH). Note that the high variability of
the Moneo figures is caused by the gradual geographical expansion of the
scheme: tapping new regions initially lowers the overall result
35. The drop in
the Moneo usage rate in the first months of 2002 is therefore not alarming per
se. However, more recent data indicate that this drop has continued well into
2003. It thus remains an open question whether Moneo will be able to regain
its position in the first cluster.
Because Banksys discontinued its data series on activated cards (and now
concentrates on the number of ‘active’ cards; see below), I have no recent
observations for Proton. However, there is little doubt that Proton would
figure amongst the first group
36. Where the Netherlands is concerned, if one
uses the estimate – reported in Section 3 (see footnote 21) – of the number of
activated cards in the Chipper and Chipknip schemes together, and if one
assumes that the ‘activation rate’of the two schemes is identical
37, one arrives
at a figure of 0.57 – which places Chipknip in the second cluster. However,
this is an estimate for December 2001 – before the introduction of the euro
and the accompanying surge in Chipknip usage. If the activation rate is kept
constant, usage rates for September-October 2002 amount to 1.6–1.8.
If one were to take into account differences in launch dates between the
schemes, it would become even more evident that miniCASH has the best
result overall, followed by the Swiss Cash scheme
38. The initial results
obtained by the relatively young Moneo scheme are also interesting. With 3.9
transactions per activated card six months after the start of the nation-wide
launch, Moneo outperforms all other schemes at that point in their lifecycle
39.
24 Usage
35 This is also true for Proton; see Van Hove (2000) for more details.
36 It could be argued that the most recent observation for Proton – relating to April 2000 –
points in the other direction. However, as is explained in footnote 20, the two most recent figures
on the number of activated Proton cards are suspiciously high. And if the number of activated
cards is overstated, the frequency of use per activated card will obviously be understated.
37 This boils down to dividing the total number of activated cards over the two schemes in
proportion to the total number of issued cards.
38 Concerning the Cash scheme, it has to be stressed that the definition of activated card used
– ‘cards with a non-zero balance’ – is somewhat more strict than the definition used by other
schemes (with the exception of MEP). Other things equal, this has the effect of increasing the
frequency of use per activated card.
39 Here too, some caution is required. I have taken as the time of ‘national launch’ of the
Moneo scheme October 2001, when French banks began including the Moneo purse on their debit
cards. However, at that time the scheme was already operational in Tours (the pilot city, since
October 1999), in Brest, Morlaix, and Quimper (since November 2000), Montpellier and Poitiers
(April 2001), Bordeaux (May 2001), and Lyon (June 2001).
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May 2003 Moneo’s performance was still comparable to that of Proton.
Finally, Figure 6 again shows that the Swiss CASH scheme and MEP in
Portugal have suffered a severe relapse.
As mentioned in Section 3, for some schemes I have data on the number of
active cards, so that the frequency of use per active card can be calculated.
Especially the results for the Proton card are of interest here. However, when
interpreting these results, one has to keep in mind that the figures are moving
averages over 6 months
40. The Proton figure of 3.30 for December 2001, for
example, tells us that a Proton card that was used for at least one purchase
transaction between July and December 2001, was used on average
19.7 times over the same period, or 3.30 times per month. Interestingly, active
Proton cards are being used more and more frequently: the value for March
2003 is 3.95.
Usage 25
40 Since active Proton cards are defined as ‘cards that have performed at least one purchase
operation in the past 6 months, I computed the frequency of use not by dividing the number of
transactions in any particular month by the number of active cards in that month, but rather by
dividing the number of transactions in the previous 6 months first by the number of active cards,
and subsequently by 6 – the latter in order to convert it into a monthly figure.
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The two final Figures in the paper offer comparative data on the average
amount outstanding on e-purses on a per capita basis, and on the number of
transactions per month and per capita. These indicators can be interpreted as
‘summary measures’ of the state of the respective schemes. Indeed, because
the indicators are expressed per capita they are influenced by the degree of
penetration; that is, the number of users relative to total population. At the
same time they are also positively correlated with actual use: the higher the
frequency of use per card, the more money users will, ceteris paribus, tend to
load onto their cards. Note, however, that even though both indicators can
thus be seen as summary statistics, a priori the schemes might to some extent
rank differently on the two indicators. Ascheme that is successful in the retail
environment should, ceteris paribus, score higher on the float indicator than
a scheme that has targeted, say, parking meters. The reason is straightforward:
on average, the value of a retail e-purse payment will tend to be higher.
Conversely, given the frequency of payments for parking the opposite might
be true for the second indicator.
Figure 7 shows that Proton is the most advanced scheme in terms of float per
capita, but taking into account the number of months elapsed since roll-out
adjusts this picture: the Luxembourg miniCASH scheme actually has
a consistently better result than Proton. It is also interesting to point out that
the bulk of Proton’s euro-jump actually took place in December 2001 – before
the advent of the euro. In the final weeks of the pre-euro era, Proton load
operations were reportedly running at three times the usual level
41. As can be
seen in the Figure, in February 2002 the total amount outstanding on Proton
cards started to decrease somewhat, but the level prevailing in March 2003
(not visible in the Figure) was still substantially higher than before the
introduction of the euro. miniCASH usage was also positively influenced by
the introduction of the euro. Two other schemes which also have experienced
a euro-jump in their float figures are Chipknip in the Netherlands and Quick
in Austria
42. In the case of Quick, a small relapse can again be noted after the
spike coinciding with the euro change-over. miniCASH and Chipknip on the
other hand did not experience such a relapse.
27
41 Source: “Belg ging massaal op zoek naar euro’s”, De Morgen, January 2, 2002.
42 The series in Figure 7 relates to the combined float for the Chipknip and Chipper schemes.
However, as is explained in the notes to Figure 1 in Appendix 2, the Chipper scheme has been
phased out so that recent observations relate to the Chipknip scheme alone.
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GeldKarte schemes are stagnating, but in all three cases the total float is
(very) gradually creeping upwards (which is not really visible in the Figure
due to the differences in scale). Where Danmønt is concerned, it should be
noted that there was a drop in the float between end-1996 and end-1997, and
it was only at the end of 2001 that the 1996 level was again reached. At
end-2002, the float was a mere 17% higher as compared to December 1996.
However, CASH in Sweden and MEP in Portugal are doing even worse.
Figure 7 shows that the Multibanco electronic purse has never really taken
off. In fact, ever since end-1997 the amount outstanding on MEP cards has
fallen almost consistently. In July 2002 it reached levels below one euro cent
per capita. The Swedish CASH scheme is not faring much better: the float has
been falling since early 2000. This was obviously a bad sign and it is thus not
really surprising that the Swedish banks have recently announced that they
will discontinue the scheme in Fall 2004
43. Finally, it will be noted that
according to the ECB Blue Book, the total amount outstanding on all Spanish
e-purses as at December 2001 was 21.63 million EUR (up from 16.77 million
EUR in December 2000). This works out to some 0.55 euro per capita, which
would place Spain in between Danmønt and Cash (SE) at that point in time.
Figure 8 presents data on the number of transactions per month and per capita,
and by and large confirms our earlier conclusions. First, Proton and
miniCASH are leading the pack, with Chipknip a good third – and improving.
As will be shown below, the latter is due to no small extent to the creation of
‘cashless environments’. Second, there are clear-cut euro-jumps for Proton,
miniCASH, Chipknip, Quick, and (albeit on a much lower scale) also for
Moneo; see Figure 8a-bis. Importantly, the euro-impact has not been limited
to the first months following the launch of the common currency but seems to
be a lasting one. In four out of the five cases – Chipknip, miniCASH, Moneo,
and Quick – transaction volumes for October 2002 were actually higher than
those for January. This is especially true for the Netherlands, where
transactions picked up steam in the spring, and have continued to rise ever
since. In Belgium, things are less clear-cut but the transaction volume, which
jumped by 60% in January 2002, was still 43% higher in October 2002
compared to December 2001. Incidentally, the drop in the number of Proton
transactions in July and August 2002 is due to seasonal fluctuations. Similar
fluctuations can also be detected for miniCASH, Chipknip, Quick, and
Moneo.
28 Summary statistics
43 Nordea, Cashkort upphör 2004, press release, January 12, 2004
<http://www.nordea.se/bin/pressm/h_press.pl?id=N/ 1151/PR/200401/930308.xml>.
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e-purses have so far not displaced cash to a substantial extent. According to
an estimate by the Belgian Bankers’ Association (BVB, 1999, p. 5), the
number of cash transactions conducted in Belgium amount to some 4 billion
per year, or 333 million per month. In March 2002, its record month so far,
the Proton scheme registered 11.9 million transactions – which is equivalent
to 3.57% of the estimated number of cash transactions. As was anticipated in
Van Hove (2000), Proton has thus been unable to reach its target of displacing
5% of cash transactions within 5 years – that is, by May 2001. And this target
was conservative compared to those of other schemes (op. cit.). According to
De Nederlandsche Bank, the number of cash transactions conducted in the
Netherlands amounted to 6.9 billion in 2001 and 6.8 billion in 2002
44. Based
on this, the two Dutch EP schemes together would have displaced some 0.4%
of cash transactions in 2001, and 1.3% in 2002. If one concentrates on
Chipknip’s record month in 2002 – that is, November – the figure becomes
1.6%. According to a December 2002 survey commissioned by Interpay
amongst a panel of 4,000 Dutch households, the Chipknip card would have
accounted for 2.1% of the total number of transactions, compared to 67.1%
for cash
45. However, the article points out that the number of cash transactions
– and thus also the total number of transactions – is probably underestimated.
In France, the number of cash transactions is estimated at 25 billion per year
46.
Judged by this benchmark, Moneo does not even appear on the radar screen:
its relative importance is below 0.01%.
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44 Sources: De Nederlandsche Bank, Annual Report 2001 and Quarterly Bulletin, March 2003.
45 Source: Interpay, Wensen, behoeften en betaalgedrag in beeld, Betaalwijzer, Nr. 4,
December 2002, p. 2.
46 Source: “Porte-monnaie: un projet déjà ancien”, in Analyses & Synthèses, Portemonnaie
électronique, Les Enquêtes d’Analyses & Synthèses, Nr. 1, 2002, p. 7.
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Afirst general conclusion from the preceding analysis is that the introduction
of the euro coins and banknotes has had a positive impact on e-purse usage in
several euro-zone countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands)
47, but – interestingly – not in all of them. For example, there has
been (virtually) no euro-inspired e-purse renaissance in either Germany or in
Italy. Some schemes have even experienced a negative euro impact in the
sense that specific terminals did not survive the change-over. This is true for
Avant in Finland and Visa Cash in Spain (see Section 4). The exact reasons
behind the disparate euro impact will be the subject of a separate paper.
However, my working hypothesis for now is that some schemes simply
lacked critical mass. For, say, a German consumer who wanted to avoid
having to use the unfamiliar euro coins and banknotes in the early days of
2002, starting to use the local GeldKarte purse was no real option as the
number of merchants accepting it was too low. This might explain why the
bigger euro jumps are seen in established e-purse markets.
Another observation that catches the eye when comparing countries is that
Scandinavia does not appear to be very fertile ground for e-purses. As
indicated above, the CASH scheme in Sweden will disappear in Fall 2004,
Danmønt in Denmark is stagnating, and Avant in Finland is not making much
progress either. To this, one might add that in Iceland – “the country in the
world that comes closest to being a card payment system” according to De
Grauwe et al. (1999, p. 1) – the announced KLINK card has failed to
materialise. Finally, Norway to date also lacks a general-purpose electronic
purse. One reason for the lack of success of e-purses in Nordic countries
appears to be that debit cards can be used for lower-value payments compared
to other countries. This is at least the case in Finland. Jyrkönen and Paunonen
(2003, p. 11–12) of the Bank of Finland point out that “the use of e-money is
at a very low level in Finland. One reason for this is that Finnish consumers
31
47 An important caveat here is that jumps in e-purse usage coinciding with the introduction of
the euro cannot always be fully attributed to this factor alone. A salient example is the
Netherlands. As will be explained below, the introduction of the euro coincided with the
introduction of Chipknip-only parking in three cities. Payment for parking in these cities alone
currently accounts for some 15% of the total number of Chipknip transactions, and was thus an
important factor behind the jump in Chipknip usage. Another example is Luxemburg, where
EFTPOS operator CETREL, as part of a promotional campaign, halved merchant commissions
on debit card and e-purse payments during January and February 2002 (Source: CETREL,
Rapport de Gestion 2001, p. 11).
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cards, that can also be used for small payments”. In this respect it is
interesting to note that, unlike in Belgium for example, Finnish debit cards are
mainly off-line (op. cit., p. 13). For Sweden and Denmark, similar
explanations were given to me by Dimitrios Ioannidis of the Sveriges
Riksbank and by Henrik Arnt Andersen of Danmarks Nationalbank – even
though in both countries debit cards function in on-line mode
48. Ioannidis
confirmed that in Sweden debit cards can be used for small-value payments
although some shops impose a minimum of SEK 100 (some EUR 10 at
current rates)
49. He also mentioned the structure of the Swedish retail sector,
with relatively few family-owned shops and many big retail chains – which
are reportedly more inclined to accept debit cards. An Internet survey on
electronic money conducted by Mattias Ekholm (a student at Kunglinga
Tekniska Högskolan in Stockholm) in cooperation with Aftonbladet.se,
a major Swedish newspaper, provides some additional evidence
50. On the
question ‘Would you rather see that the credit/debit card were easier to use on
small values?’, a resounding 84% of respondents answered affirmatively
51,
thus revealing a clear preference for debit cards even for small amounts. For
Denmark, Andersen stressed that debit cards are free of charge for consumers
and merchants alike
52. As a result, “debit cards are used for virtually all
transactions”, even transactions of 1 or 2 euro
53. Finally, concerning Iceland
the European Card Review notes that the Icelandic banks have abandoned the
KLINK purse precisely because debit card use has “been successfully
extended to low value payments in merchants such as newspapers and fast
food outlets. Because the fraud risk is negligible, cardholders are able to pay
for low value items such as newspapers without signature or PIN verification.
‘Transactions only take a few seconds, making cards more convenient than
cash,’ says [Richard] Cullen [who has responsibility for Iceland in Visa EU].
32 Main findings
48 Source: Ioannidis, D., telephone conversation, October 25, 2002; Anderson, H. A., personal
e-mail, May 22, 2003.
49 Note that even this limit is low compared to common practice elsewhere in Europe. Dutch
banks, for example, advise consumers to use cash or e-purse for amounts below EUR 15, and debit
cards for amounts above EUR 15 (Source: Interpay, Wensen, behoeften en betaalgedrag in beeld,
Betaalwijzer, Nr. 4, December 2002, p. 3).
50 Cf. Utter, H., Framtidens plænbok är elektronisk, Aftonbladet, October 12, 2001,
<http://aftonbladet.se/vss/ekonomi/story/0,2789,96027,00.html>.
51 Ekholm, M., personal e-mail, August 5, 2002. 1,028 answers were received, 31 of which
were discarded for various reasons.
52 Cf. Rolfe (2003, p. 19): “Under Danish law, Dankort is tightly-regulated as well. In terms
of section 14 of the ‘Act on certain payment instruments’ (PCA), banks are prevented from
charging fees to merchants for Dankort acceptance”. To be clear: banks are allowed to charge
cardholders but they do not (probably for competitive reasons).
53 Source: Anderson, H. A., personal e-mail, May 22, 2003.
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‘Klink’ electronic purse launched in the mid-1990s” (ECR, 2002).
Continuing our geographical overview, it is striking that e-purses are not very
popular in Southern Europe either. As indicated in previous Sections, the
Portuguese Multibanco purse has de facto disappeared, none of the Spanish
schemes is gaining much ground, and neither is MINIpay in Italy. In Greece
no electronic purse has even been launched. I have no firm explanation for
this observation. One might argue that in several of these countries debit cards
are typically less popular compared to countries where e-purses are relatively
successful. Up to a certain point the popularity of debit cards might indeed be
an indicator of the readiness of a population to embrace electronic payment
instruments in general
54. E-purse operators also tend to piggyback on the
existing debit card infrastructure (see Section 3). The Blue Book statistics for
2000 confirm that the number of debit card payments per capita is
significantly lower in Greece (0.1 per year), Italy (5.5), and Spain (7.2) than
in Belgium (39.8). However, the explanation does not hold for Portugal as the
number of debit card payments per capita (45.3) exceeds the level prevailing
in Belgium. Still, the Portuguese MEP cards are mainly stand-alone cards
55.
An interesting development in Italy – where, to repeat, MINIpay is not
making much headway – is that prepaid magnetic-stripe cards are starting to
catch on. These cards allow teenagers and others without bank accounts to
make purchases using the same point-of-sale and transaction processing
networks as debit and credit cardholders
56.
Recapitulating, our geographical overview has so far shown that e-purses are
not very successful in either Scandinavia or in Mediterranean Europe. That
leaves countries that lie at the heart of Europe, and – interestingly
– particularly smaller countries. Luxembourg is the most salient example but
Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland are also small compared
to, say, Germany. As explained in Section 3, in view of the network
externalities involved it is crucial to have sufficient penetration both in terms
of merchants and (active) cardholders. Moreover, it is advisable to reach this
critical mass as soon as possible after launch. One could argue that this is
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54 I have added the qualification ‘up to a certain point’ because the Nordic experience
described earlier seems to indicate that the relationship is not necessarily a linear one. Note that in
Denmark (77.1) and Finland (49.3) the number of debit card payments per capita is higher than in
Belgium. The figure for Sweden is 28.9.
55 Cf. “Some debit and/or credit cards include the PMB card facility” (CPSS, 2001, p. 66; my
emphasis).
56 Source: “Prepaid payment cards start to catch on in Italy”, Card Technology News Bulletin,
February 18, 2003.
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it possible to focus promotional efforts. In addition, chances are that the
number of actors – both issuers of cards and organisations on the acceptance
side – is lower, thus reducing coordination problems. For example, it may be
sufficient to convince one or two operators and/or authorities in order to attain
adequate coverage in the parking business. The environment might also be
more homogeneous in terms of the technology used in, say, vending
machines.
In this respect it is interesting to note that Belgian and French operators have
launched their purses on a city-by-city basis right from the start (see
Section 3). Perhaps even more interesting is the fact that Europay Switzerland
reconsidered its strategy in year 5. Rather than continue to target the whole of
the territory, in 2001 the ‘Zenterstrategie’ was introduced, as is evident from
the Annual Report for that year: “A new concept is geographic focusing:
efforts will now be concentrated on so-called ‘A centers’ – or cities, which
have converted public transportation to CASH”
57. In the same year, the
marketing campaign of ZKA in Germany also started targeting cities.
Recently München was chosen as the ‘GeldKarte-Vorreiterstadt 2003’
(GeldKarte pioneer city 2003)
58. According to Jan Hendrikx, Euro
Kartensysteme CEO, such actions are successful; “we’ve found that with
a push, usage jumps 40%–60% and stays there” (ECR, 2003a, p. 5). In
München, GeldKarte transactions even jumped by 116% in the first half of
2003
59.
Another conclusion is that in a market where network externalities are
important, incompatibility may well prove detrimental (Van Hove, 1999b).
It creates uncertainty among consumers and merchants, and cuts up the
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57 Source: Telekurs, Annual Report 2001, p. 18. Cf. also the following two quotes: “Von der
flächendeckenden Erstürmung der Schweiz ist die Europay inzwischen weggekommen: Zu teuer.
Jetzt konzentriert man sich auf bestimmte Agglomerationen. “Wir lernen aus den Fehlern”,
kommentiert [CEO] Bischoff (Baschek, E., “Das Kind lernt endlich laufen”, HandelsZeitung,
January 30, 2002, p. 6 <http://www.handelszeitung.ch/archiv/>). “Europay fördert CASH vor
allem in großen Städten: Die entsprechenden Promotionen in Genf, Lausanne, Neuenburg,
Lugano, Luzern und Bern zeigen Wirkung” (Europay Switzerland, “Wachtumspotential bleibt
unvermindert hoch”, Europay News, Nr. 1, April 2002, p. 3).
58 Source: S-Card, München ist neue GeldKarte-Vorreiterstadt, news release, March 28, 2003
<http://www.scard.de/news/>. Interestingly, BitWallet in Japan seems to be following a similar
strategy in promoting its Edy purse: “In addition to going after large retail chains, BitWallet is also
looking to court independent retailers in single locations to create something like Edy hot spots
where a large number of retailers accept the card” (Source: “Japan’s contactless cash goes
nationwide”, Itworld.com, July 19, 2002).
59 Source: EURO Kartensysteme, Akzeptanz der GeldKarte in München steigt deutlich
–V orreiterstadt-Kampagne erfolgreich, press release, September 4, 2003.
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mention the battle between Chipknip and Chipper in the Netherlands, and the
fragmented e-purse market in Spain (see the notes in Appendix 2 for more
details about both cases). In France and Switzerland, it initially also looked
like several schemes were going to compete head-to-head, but luckily in
these countries all players agreed upon a common solution before any of the
schemes was launched on a national scale. Interestingly, in Finland the first
version of the Avant e-purse was launched by a subsidiary of the central bank.
By taking an active part in the development of the new payment instrument,
the Bank of Finland precisely wished “to avoid the unnecessary emergence
of several parallel or overlapping card systems in Finland” (Kokkola and
Pauli, 1994, p. 13).
However, agreeing on a common standard is one thing, for an e-purse to
become successful all participating issuers and acquirers must be completely
committed. This is not evident as it implies cooperation between competitors.
Belgium and Luxembourg are two countries where this seems to have
happened without problems. In a recent article, Frans Baeyens, general
manager, domestic payments and deposits at KBC Bank in Belgium is quoted
saying: “2002 was the first year the banks made a profit on this activity. It
required an enormous effort, but all the parties involved kept the faith in the
business case for years on end” (ECR, 2003a, my emphasis). I have also not
come across any evidence of major rifts between banks in Austria and France
(although in the latter case the national launch of Moneo may have been
delayed by the search for a common solution). In Germany, on the other hand,
the GeldKarte is a priority for the co-operative and savings banks, but far less
so for the private banks (see footnote 7). Importantly, a recent survey by
InterCard shows that while on a national scale chip penetration (as
a percentage of the number of ec cards issued) averages 68%, in some regions
this figure is below 26% – depending on which (type of) banks have a high
market share in those regions. This is particularly true for former Eastern
Germany
60. In Switzerland, the Post Office – which accounts for roughly one
third of the debit card market – joined the Cash system with some delay, and
then only half-heartedly. As is explained in Section 3, the Cash purse is not
included on the Postcard debit card, but is issued by Postfinance as a separate
card for which customers have to apply and pay
61. This gives the impression
that Postcard Cash is currently not considered a strategically important
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60 Source: InterCard, Chip-Ausstattung der ec-Bankkarten fällt auf unter 70%, press release,
April 2, 2003.
61 See the notes to Figure 1 in Appendix 2 for further details.
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62. According to Fabio Casali, Head of Product Marketing – Pay
Before at Telekurs Europay AG, Telekurs is in talks with Die Post to put the
CASH function on their debit cards but, if at all, this will only happen in
2–3 years
63. In Sweden, Svenska Handelsbanken entered the CASH
consortium three years later than its peers, i.e. in 2000 (see notes to Figure 1
in Appendix 2). But oddly enough Handelsbanken has yet to issue its first
card
64. In practice the CASH purse is thus promoted not by 80% of the
Swedish bank card market as the CPSS (2001, p. 76) claims, but by 70%
–roughly the same level as in Switzerland. Moreover, S-E Banken only puts the
CASH chip onto its debit cards if the customer asks for it
65. Where Danmark is
concerned, Rolfe (2003, p. 20) notes that while “Danmønt expanded strongly in
its early years, it began to suffer from lack of follow-through, especially in
marketing”. Reportedly, marketing of the Danmønt product was reduced
constantly after PBS acquired TeleDanmark’s interest in 1997 and began
operating Danmønt as a wholly-owned subsidiary. As a result, relations with
vendors and service providers deteriorated (ECR, 2000a). For Portugal, the
European Card Review noted in mid-2000 that “further development of the
PMB purse [was] low priority for the banking community” (ECR, 2000b, p.8)
66.
Finally, in Finland, when it comes to promoting Avant “different banks have
been leading and lagging ... at different times”, according to Jyri Marviala of
Automatia
67.
In the preceding Sections I have repeatedly stressed the importance of
network externalities. According to the network externalities theory, what
matters is the size of the network. For cardholders this means the number of
terminals, for merchants it is the number of (active) cardholders. This theory
does indeed help explain many of the inter-country differences in the uptake
of e-purses. For example, it helps explain why miniCASH in Luxembourg,
with a higher number of terminals and cardholders at comparable points in
time (see Figures 1b and 4), outperforms Proton in Belgium – and all other
36 Main findings
62 A newspaper report confirms this: “Die Post hält das Produkt für ‘nicht strategisch’ und
beschränkt sich auf 70.000 Karten, die speziell auf Anfrage abgegeben werden. ‘Bei Postfinance
hält sich die Nachfrage nach dem Produkt konstant auf eher niedrigen Niveau’, erklärt
Mediensprecher Alex Josty” (Baschek, E., “Das Kind lernt endlich laufen”, HandelsZeitung,
January 30, 2002, p. 6 <http://www.handelszeitung.ch/archiv/>).
63 Source: Casali, F., personal e-mail, March 20, 2003.
64 Source: Geuken, Fr., personal e-mail, April 9, 2003.
65 Source: Geuken, Fr., personal e-mail, April 17, 2003.
66 This was confirmed to me by Pedro Hipólito of SIBS: “None of the Portuguese financial
institutions is promoting PMB due to the poor business model” (Hipólito, P., personal e-mail,
December 20, 2002).
67 Source: Marviala, J., personal e-mail, August 20, 2002.
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German GeldKarte card, with a low level of terminals (see Figure 4),
performs less well than Proton
68. On the other hand, in this theoretical
framework the initially limited success of the Chipknip card in the
Netherlands is – at least at first sight – rather puzzling. As appears from
Figures 1b and 4, both the number of cards and terminals was significantly
higher than for Proton; yet the Chipknip scheme made little progress (see
Figures 7 and 8b). However, as was pointed out in Section 4, a large
proportion of the Chipknip terminals were in fact converted debit card
terminals, which are typically of limited use for e-purse users
69. As pointed
out in Van Hove (2000), this was even more of a problem for the Austrian
Quick scheme: at the end of 1998, no less than 92% of all terminals were
“Bankomat-Kasse POS” terminals. By the end of 2001, this proportion had
not changed
70. However, recently things seem to be changing for the better
somewhat: in May 2003, the combined share of vending machines and
attended Quick-only terminals in the retail sector stood at 10% (compared to
9.8% in December 2002)
71. The relative importance of converted
Bankomat-Kasse terminals thus decreases gradually. Interestingly, while such
terminals represented 92% of the Quick network at the end of 2001, they only
accounted for some 30% of all Quick payments in the fourth quarter of 2001
(Mooslechner et al., 2002, p. 102, Chart 6).
Afinal lesson is therefore that besides the quantity of terminals, their ‘quality’
matters too. More concretely, an electronic purse needs the support of at least
one and possibly more sectors with a large number of small cash payments:
public telephones, parking meters, vending machines and/or public transport.
To start with payphones, it is clear that their importance has been diminishing
due to the phenomenal uptake of mobile phones. However, in Belgium the
deal with Belgacom early in the lifecycle of Proton was a vital one for
Banksys. Public payphones proved to be a very popular application (Van
Hove, 2000) and – perhaps even more important – it was an ideal way to get
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68 When looking at Figure 1b, one could point out that in the first three years of the GeldKarte
and Proton schemes, the former had the highest penetration rate in terms of the number of cards
in circulation. However, what matters is the number of active cards because this is what merchants
observe. And the number of active GeldKarte cards was/is clearly very low (see Figure 3).
69 Indirect evidence reveals that the relative importance of combi terminals has dropped.
According to a case study on the Proton World site (at
<http://www.protonworld.com/casestudies/dompurse_nl_factors.htm>), U-POS terminals
represented 20.4% of the Chipknip network at the end of 2002 compared to an estimated 16% at
the end of 1999 (Van Hove, 2000).
70 Source: Europay Austria, Business Report 2001, p. 30.
71 Source: own calculations based on Europay Austria information.
Suerf 4_2004 s poznamkami  12.7.2004  11:28  Stránka 37people to use Proton for the first time. According to Jan Hendrikx, Euro
Kartensysteme CEO, the main lesson from the German experience is
precisely to get more cardholders to take the first step and use GeldKarte:
“Once they use it, they stay with the product” (ECR, 2003a, p. 5)
72.
Parking is another application which can generate high transaction volumes,
especially in so-called cashless environments. The Netherlands is the case in
point here. As is explained in more detail in the notes to Figure 1 (in Appendix
2), several local authorities in the Netherlands seized upon the introduction of
the euro to introduce payment by Chipknip for their parking facilities. In
Purmerend, Nijmegen and Rotterdam, this even became the only way to pay
for parking in the streets. As a result, the number of Chipknip payments for
parking jumped by more than 600% in 2000, to 25 million transactions. No
less than half of these transactions took place in the three cities mentioned
73.
Overall, in February 2003 parking accounted for 31% of the total number of
Chipknip payments, even though at the end of 2002 the sector accounted for
only 5.7% of all Chipknip terminals
74. However, the impact is even bigger
than this since there is a clear spill-over effect from parking to other payment
segments: in Purmerend, the number of Chipknip payments in the retail sector
increased by 127% in the first half of 2002, whereas the national average was
only 28%
75. Interestingly, BMS in France is also pushing purse-only parking.
At parking meters in the Paris suburb of Boulogne-Billancourt, the Moneo
card is already de rigueur – the only acceptable method of payment
76. BMS
is also in talks with the City of Paris in order to replace the Paris Carte –
which is currently used at the 12,500 parking meters in Paris – by Moneo
(BMS, 2002b, p. 4)
77.
38 Main findings
72 Cf. also the following statement by Andreas Koebe, then sales manager for S-Card Service,
the payment card services and marketing unit of Sparkassen-Finanzgruppe: “We did some market
research, and we saw that once [consumers] used GeldKarte in vending machines, for tickets, they
saw it as an advantage. And, once they have learned to use the GeldKarte, they will stick to it”
(Card Technology, 2002, p. 8).
73 Source: De Nederlandsche Bank, Current developments in payments and securities
transactions, Quarterly Bulletin, March 2003, p. 20.
74 Sources: Interpay website and case study on the Proton World site (at
<http://www.protonworld.com/casestudies/ dompurse_nl_factors.htm>).
75 Source: Interpay, Cashless parkeren stimuleert Chipknip-gebruik elders, Betaalwijzer,
December 2002, p. 7. Importantly, the difference cannot be explained by developments on the
acceptance side. In 2002, the number of non-parking terminals increased by 14.6% in Purmerend,
compared to 9.8% nationally (Source: Vergoossen, A., personal e-mail, February 10, 2003).
76 “Moneo fonctionne sur tous les horodateurs de Boulogne-Billancourt”, in Analyses &
Synthèses, Portemonnaie électronique, Les Enquêtes d’Analyses & Synthèses, Nr. 1, 2002, p. 14.
77 See also “La Ville de Paris veut généraliser la carte”, Le Monde, January 19, 2003.
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Switzerland. For some years now, Telekurs Europay is following a niche
marketing strategy. A recent Proton World case study states: “In 2002 it was
decided based on a review of past performance that CASH should be
marketed as a niche product”
78. The identified niche markets are: “public
mobility ...; parking; branded channels: retail chains such as coffee shops,
fast-food and kiosks; closed user groups (...); e-government”
79. However, the
focussed marketing strategy is older than this. A press release accompanying
Europay Switzerland’s annual report for 2000 stated: “The primary emphasis
for acquiring was placed on vending machines and in the public
transportation sector”
80. As a result, the network of Cash acceptance points at
the end of 2002 comprised 10,000 vending machines, 2,000 ticket machines
in buses and local transportation, and 2,000 car park ticket machines
81. On
a total of some 33,500 acceptance points, this implies a share of no less than
42% for so-called U-POS terminals, up from 20% at end-1999, and 12% at
end-1998 (Van Hove, 2000). I am not aware of any other scheme which puts
more emphasis on U-POS – not even miniCASH in Luxembourg
82.
Usage figures for Chipknip in the Netherlands and for Quick in Austria
confirm that vending machines and U-POS in general are popular
applications. In the Netherlands, vending machines represented 5.3% of the
terminal park at end-2002, but with 18.4% their share in the total number of
Chipknip transactions over the year 2002 was significantly larger. In Austria,
U-POS (comprising parking meters, public transport ticket machines, laundry
machines, etc.) was good for 62% of all Quick payments in the fourth quarter
of 2001 (Mooslechner et al., 2002, p. 102, Chart 6)
83, even though U-POS
terminals represented only 5.9% of the terminal park in June 2002 – and
probably even less over 2001
84.
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78 Proton World, CASH in Switzerland, case study, March 2003.
79 Ibidem.
80 Europay Switzerland, Successful reorganization, press release, April 2001.
81 Proton World, CASH in Switzerland, case study, March 2003.
82 For miniCASH, I have no specific data on the share of U-POS terminals. However, at the
end of 2002 miniCASH-only terminals – which is a broader category – accounted for some 35%
of all terminals, compared to 38% at end-2001 (own calculations based on CETREL, Rapport
Annuel 2002, April 29, 2003). This said, a November 2000 press release notes that the majority of
miniCASH payments were made in the payphones and parking sectors, and in the U-POS sector
(Source: CETREL, miniCASH – maxi confort ou 1 millions de paiements miniCASH, press
release, November 15, 2000).
83 Up from 50% in October 2000 (Source: “Euro-Einführung sollte Schub für elektronische
Geldbörse bringen”, Der Standard, December 6, 2002).
84 Source: Europay Austria press releases.
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GeldKarte-enabled cigarette vending machines. In an attempt to curb
underage smoking, the German Ministry of Health has decided that by
January 1st, 2007 all of the country’s more than 600,000 cigarette vending
machines will have to be able to determine whether the consumer is at least
16, the legal smoking age in Germany
85. Following agreements between on
the one hand savings and co-operative banks (represented by DSGVand BVR
respectively) and on the other hand the federation of German tobacco
wholesalers and cigarette vending machines suppliers, newly issued debit
cards will contain a legal-age code and by 2007 all machines will accept the
GeldKarte as payment
86. In Fall 2002, 50,000 of these machines had already
been equipped. By end-2003 this figure had increased to 80,000
87. Even
though smokers will still be able to pay with cash once the age-check is done,
a German consulting firm predicted that “if consumers were required to insert
their GeldKarte in order to patronize cigarette vending machines, the
machines alone would play host to 600 million GeldKarte transactions in
2007”
88. That is almost 17 times the total of all GeldKarte transactions in
2002. Similar projects are in the pipeline in the Netherlands and apparently
also in Switzerland
89.
As the Octopus scheme in Hong Kong has shown
90, another potential
volume-booster and door opener might be public transport. However, all in
all, European e-purse operators have been slow in bringing electronic
40 Main findings
85 Card Technology, Hey buddy, you got a GeldKarte?, Card Technology News Bulletin,
October 17, 2002. Note that some sources talk about 800,000 cigarette machines (Cf. Card
Technology, Can the Internet and cigarettes save GeldKarte?, Card Technology News Bulletin,
March 21, 2002; ePaymentsnews, Geldkarte e-purse grows in usage and sophistication,
ePaymentsnews Review, No. 6, December 2002).
86 S-Card, DSGV-Pressemeldung zur GeldKarte-Jahresstatistik 2002, press release, January
31, 2003 <http://www.scard.de/>. The association of the public banks is still in negotiations. The
private banks, having issued a negligible number of purses (see footnote 7), have yet to make
a move.
87 Koppe, V. and K. Bregulla, GeldKarte: deutliche Steigerung der GeldKarte-Akzeptanz,
workshop, OMNICARD, Berlin, January 15, 2004, p. 8
<http://www.geldkarte.de/ww/de/pub/aktuelles/omnicard_2004.htm>.
88 Card Technology, Hey buddy, you got a GeldKarte?, Card Technology News Bulletin,
October 17, 2002.
89 Sources: Interpay, Sigaretten trekken met Chipknip, news release, March 1, 2003; Proton
World, CASH in Switzerland, case study, March 2003.
90Acaveat here is that a distinction has to be made between the number of trips registered and
the number of actual e-purse payments made (for single fares). Also, Octopus is only slowly
making inroads in the retail environment. At end-2002, non-transport transactions accounted for
5% of the turnover (Source: ECR, Hong Kong: Octopus spreads its tentacles, European Card
Review, Vol. 10, No. 1, January/February 2003, p. 5). More recent estimates put the share of retail
at 10% (Balaban, 2003).
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European schemes are contact-based, whereas the preferred option for
transport applications is obviously a contactless card – as in Hong Kong. As
a result, if a European e-purse can be used in the transport sector at all, tickets
are typically not loaded onto the card. Rather the card can be used to buy
paper tickets at vending machines (and in some cases at terminals on buses).
With few exceptions
91, projects also tend to concentrate on regions or cities
92.
Prospects for increased usage of e-purses in the transport environment differ
significantly across schemes. In Belgium, where so far not much emphasis
has been placed on the use of Proton for transport applications, the portable
payment and ticketing terminals carried by the staff on every train will be able
to accept Proton by 2004
93. In 2001, Banksys announced that by 2004 all
Belgian debit cards would be so-called combi cards capable of handling
contactless transactions so that by 2005 paper tickets for all transport modes
in Brussels would be completely eliminated
94. However, according to industry
sources this timetable no longer stands. In Finland, “one of Europe’s biggest
multi-transport smart card based fare collection systems” was launched in
Helsinki, the capital city, in Fall of 2002
95. The system has been designed to
handle an estimated 1.2 million travel transactions a day. The main goal was
to replace all seasonal and serial (paper and cardboard) tickets by a smart
card. While that smart card is not the Avant card but a separate transport card
(called Travel Card), all terminals and vending machines in metro and train
stations have been equipped to accept Avant payments for single fares
96. In
France, the transport future of the local Moneo purse looks particularly bright,
which should not come as a surprise given that both Paris’ main transit
operator RATP and the French railways SNCF are shareholders of BMS (see
Section 3). Since October 2001, RATP has progressively been issuing
a contactless card, named Navigo Pass
97. In late 2002, more than 500,000
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91 One such exception is the Avant card in Finland: “At the railway stations, Avant coverage
has already extended nationwide as all self-service terminals for train tickets are accepting Avant
payments” (Automatia News, August 2002 <http://www.avant.fi/newsine.html>). CECA in Spain
manages transport ticket applications in 16 cities with about 6 million transactions per month.
However, these are performed by means of a special application that is separate from the Euro
6000 e-purse (Source: de Andrés Turrión, A., personal e-mail, June 20, 2003).
92 Cf. Munich in the case of the GeldKarte.
93 Source: “Vanaf 2004 betaalcomputers op treinen”, De Morgen, November 2, 2002.
94 Source: “MIVB schakelt over op Proton”, De Morgen, May 22, 2001.
95 Source: “Helsinki implements ticketing system”, Cards Worldwide news, September 24,
2002.
96 See <http://www.ytv.fi/matkakortti/english/faq.html> for more details about the Travel Card.
97 Source: Treguier, Chr, “Moneo, Navigo, Calypso: cartes à puce en quête de respectabilité”,
ZDNet France, November 12, 2002 <http://news.zdnet.fr/story/0,,t118-s2125770,00.html>.
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accept them. By mid-2003, RATP plans to have issued 1 million cards – the
ultimate goal being 5 million
98. Initially, RATP is only issuing Navigo cards
to riders who buy annual or monthly passes. However, the Navigo has been
conceived from the start as a multi-application card, capable of hosting, for
example, an electronic purse – in this case the Moneo purse
99. According to
BMS (2002a), in the course of 2003 the first subway stations should have
been equipped to accept Moneo. Moreover, SNCF has decided to accept
Moneo in all its vending machines and ticket windows
100. In the Netherlands,
on the other hand, Interpay seems to have missed the public transport boat.
Together with ERG, the Australian company (and former owner of Proton
World), Interpay participated in a tender for the Dutch National Public
Transport system, but lost. The tender comprised the development of
a contactless transport card, to be introduced nationwide in 2004.
A consortium with Vialis, Accenture, Thales and the Hong Kong public
transport company MTR Corporation won the bid.
Finally there is the Internet, where electronic purses could potentially be used
for micro-payments. Opinions differ as to whether this can become an
important application. According to Carmen Carnero, of Visa
España/SERMEPA, “the key opportunities for the electronic purse in Spain
are digital TV, Internet micro-payments, mobile commerce” (Carnero,
2002a). In Belgium, Banksys showed themselves quite early to be aware of
the Proton card’s potential as a secure means of payment for the Internet:
Banksys made the first version of its C-ZAM/PC terminal available to the
general public as early as December 1997. However, Proton met with limited
success on-line, and in 2002 Internet payments with Proton were discontinued
without drum or trumpet
101. In Germany, consumers have been able to use
their GeldKarte for buying on the Web since January 2001, but reportedly few
consumers have readers and relatively few sites accept the card
102. As argued
in Van Hove (1999b), part of the explanation for these failures undoubtedly
42 Main findings
98 Sources: Davis (2003) and Davis, D., 2003: chip cards break new ground, Card Technology,
December 2002 <http://www.cardtechnology.com/cgi-bin/readstory.pl?story=2002121
6CTMS631.xml>.
99 Interestingly, according to the latest edition of the Red Book, of the Paris mass
transportation users, “only 50% are bank cardholders” (CPSS, 2003b, p. 121).
100 Preparations are expected to take 12 to 18 months (BMS, 2002a).
101 Loading the Proton card over the Internet is still possible.
102 Sources: Card Technology, Can the Internet and cigarettes save GeldKarte?, Card
Technology News Bulletin, March 21, 2002; “Vielfalt an Bezahlsystemen bremst E-Commerce”,
Heise Online, March 7, 2002.
Suerf 4_2004 s poznamkami  12.7.2004  11:28  Stránka 42lies in the persisting lack of interoperability between the different national
e-purse schemes. As a result, only local Internet merchants will accept the
card so that the number of on-line acceptance points will be too low to
warrant the purchase of a card reader. And the longer it takes for the Common
Electronic Purse Specifications to become a reality, the smaller the window
of opportunity for e-purses.
Main findings 43
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In the preceding Section, I have offered a number of partial explanations for
the observed differences in penetration and usage rates of e-purses in Europe.
Table 1 (see following page) tries to summarize the lessons learned. To that
end, the first 4 columns of the Table present a number of general
characteristics of the countries under consideration and their payment
systems, whereas the final 4 columns concentrate on the characteristics of
their respective e-purse schemes. In the Table, an attempt has been made to
rank the countries according to the degree of success of the local e-purse(s).
To be more precise, the indicator used in ranking the countries has been the
number of transactions per capita and per month, and this 36 months – or
3 years – after national launch. In short, the philosophy behind the Table is
similar to the one used in Figure 8b
103. The figures in brackets behind the
names of the countries refer to their ranking after 5 years. miniCASH and
Moneo have no such ranking because they have been launched only relatively
recently.
In the Table, entries in bold indicate ‘positive’characteristics, whereas shaded
entries point towards ‘negative’ characteristics. For example, the shaded
entries in the first column indicate that e-purse operators in Germany, France,
Italy and Spain have had – ceteris paribus – a harder time trying to turn their
new payment product into a success simply because of the size of their
country. That is, unless they opted for a phased introduction (as in France) or
for a strategy of geographic focussing (as in Germany after some time); see
column 6. In some columns, I have not shaded or put in bold anything at all.
This is because a priori the direction of the correlation is not clear-cut. For
example, one could interpret a high level of currency usage as a sign that there
is a large potential market for e-purses (that has not yet been invaded by debit
cards as in Finland; see Section 7)
104. However, at the same time it could also
45
103 As explained in Section 6, the number of transactions per capita can be considered to be
a summary statistic. The reason why I did not use float figures – the other summary statistic – is
of a pragmatic nature: I completely lack float figures for Switzerland. The choice for 36 months
was in part also pragmatic: extending the time period would have led to the exclusion of
miniCASH and Moneo, the two schemes that are relative newcomers. Even in the present Table,
Moneo is somewhat disadvantaged because my time series ends in month 25 after launch.
104 Note that C/GDP is not a good indicator of currency usage for everyday transactions
because C is also affected by the extent of hoarding and by the size of the underground economy.
However, there are no reliable comparative data on cash transactions.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Suerf 4_2004 s poznamkami  12.7.2004  11:28  Stránka 46be seen as an indicator of strong resistance against electronic means of
payment in general. Concerning column 3 it can be noted that, as is explained
in Section 7, the relationship between the popularity of debit cards and the
readiness of a population to embrace e-purses is not necessarily a linear one.
The information presented in the Table is obviously very rough and does not
permit to draw definitive conclusions. However, it is no coincidence that the
bold entries can be found primarily in the top half of the Table, and that the
opposite is true for the shaded entries. Simplifying somewhat, the ultimate
profile of a successful e-purse scheme seems to be: a scheme active in
a relatively small country (and/or one that has opted for a phased
introduction), where debit cards are fairly popular but function in on-line
mode (and/or cannot be used for low-value payments
105), where all players
quickly agreed upon a common solution so that there were no incompatibility
problems, where all (major) banks participate in the scheme and prove to be
completely committed, and – finally – where the e-purse project receives
support from players in at least one and possibly several of the following
sectors: public telephones, parking meters, vending machines, and public
transport.
In conclusion it can be stated that the introduction of the euro seems to have
separated the corn from the chaff in the European electronic purse market.
A number of schemes – miniCASH in Luxembourg, Proton in Belgium,
Chipknip in the Netherlands, Cash in Switzerland, and Quick in Austria – are
doing increasingly well and in all probability are here to stay for quite some
time. With the obvious exception of the Swiss purse, these schemes have also
received what appears to be a lasting boost from the introduction of the euro.
On the other hand, the jury is still out on several schemes which have either
been launched recently (Moneo) or are making little or no headway
(GeldKarte in Germany
106, Avant in Finland, Danmønt in Denmark, MINIpay
Concluding remarks 47
105 As the Finnish case illustrates (see Section 7), the presence of an off-line debit card can
reduce the market for an e-purse. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the latest EMV
releases from Visa and MasterCard, VSDC and MChip4, contain the ability to pre-authorize
off-line debit payments. MasterCard calls this pre-authorized debit, Visa calls it VSDC+ or Visa
Low Value Payments. The ECR (2003b) stresses that “both associations seem to be positioning
pre-authorized debit as a low value payments tool which could provide a viable alternative to
electronic purse cards”.
106 In its annual report for 2002, the Deutsche Bundesbank notes that “in Germany, the use of
e-money is stagnating at a relatively low level and it is not possible to tell at present whether
a much wider use can be expected” (Deutsche Bundesbank, Annual Report 2002, May 2003,
p. 132).
Suerf 4_2004 s poznamkami  12.7.2004  11:28  Stránka 47in Italy, all three Spanish schemes). Some schemes have even experienced
a relapse and are on their way out (CASH in Sweden
107, and particularly MEP
in Portugal). In short, both the current state and the future of e-purses in
Europe look mixed.
48 Concluding remarks
107 In a recent article, Nyberg and Guibourg (2003, p. 32) of the Sveriges Riksbank still had
some hope: “Thus far, the Cash Card has not won much acceptance in Sweden (this also applies
to other markets for that matter) and, recently, growth has even been negative in terms of the
number of transactions.... However, the development of card-based e-money is still at an
embryonic stage. Therefore, there is reason for caution when it comes to making forecasts of its
future evolution”.
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As explained in the main text, for some graphs two versions are presented:
one with a normal time axis and a second one with on the horizontal axis the
number of months since roll-out. The latter date is not always straightforward
to determine. In most cases I have taken the date at which the scheme was
expanded beyond the pilot region. Note that this does not necessarily mean
that cards and terminals became available on a nation-wide scale at that point
in time. In chronological order, the dates that were used are as follows:
Danmønt DK March 1993
MEP/PMB PT April 1995
Proton BE May  1996
Monedero 4B ES June 1996
Visa Cash ES July 1996
Chipknip NL September 1996
GeldKarte DE October 1996
Quick AT October 1996
Cash CH February  1997
Euro 6000 ES February 1997
CASH SE May 1997
MINIpay IT May 1997
Avant FI April 1997
miniCASH LU March 1999
Moneo FR October 2001
Figure 1 – Total number of cards in circulation
Avant (Finland) – The figures relate only to the multi-function card
introduced in March 1997 – sometimes termed Avant II – which replaced the
original Avant card. In order to have a homogeneous time series, the figures
include only reloadable cards. As such the figures used here are in line with
the figures reported in the Red Book, but are lower than those mentioned in
the Blue Book. The latter also include disposable Avant cards, the last of
which were valid until end-2000.
65
Suerf 4_2004 s poznamkami  12.7.2004  11:28  Stránka 65CASH (Switzerland) – The first e-purse scheme in Switzerland was operated
not by the Swiss banks but by the Swiss PTT, and began trials as far back as
November 1991. For a while it looked like two competing schemes were
going to enter the market because the banks also started working on
a Proton-based e-purse, with Europay Switzerland functioning as the
promoter and Telekurs Payserv as the operator. However, in early 1996 the
Post Office and the Swiss banks entered into a strategic alliance
108. The banks
launched the CASH scheme on a national scale in January 1997, with the Post
Office joining the system with Postcard Cash in October 1997. This delay was
due to the technical adaptations needed to make the Bancomat and Postomat
ATMs interoperable (in order to provide a fully compatible loading facility
for the CASH purse)
109. Another reason, pointed out by Clarke (1998), was the
following: “The [interoperability] arrangement is problematical from
a technical perspective. The PTT’s 1.3 million PostCards already carry an
ISO7816 chip, a Bull chip which performs the on-line debit-card and
Postomat ATM functions. An additional or alternative PostCard will now
need to be issued bearing the Proton chip. The two will, of course, be
mutually exclusive; and on the new PostCard, the debit-card and ATM
functions, if offered at all, will have to migrate back to the magnetic-stripe”.
Eventually, the Post Office decided to issue an additional kind of Postcard
(a blue one), which only includes the CASH capability. The blue Postcard was
intended to complement the PTT’s mainstream white Postcard (which is an
ATM and debit-card, both on chip) and black Postcard (which is a credit-card)
(op. cit.). Importantly, this implies that whereas CASH is a supplemental
function on the bank-issued ec/Maestro card, Post Office customers have to
apply for a blue Postcard. Moreover, they have to fork out a one-time fee of
CHF 10
110 (which amounts to CHF 2.50 per year because the card is valid for
4 years) whereas bank customers do not face an additional outlay since the
CASH function is included in the annual fee. In 1998, Clarke (op. cit.)
asserted that it was not clear that “the PTT [would] market its PostCard
ec-Cash option particularly aggressively”. An indication that seems to
confirm this is that in October 2002 Postcard Cash purses only accounted for
some 6% of the total number of activated purses, whereas the Post Office had
at end-2000 a market share of 37% in terms of debit cards (Source: own
calculations based on the BIS Red Book and Europay Switzerland data).
66 Appendix 2 – Notes to Figures
108 Telekurs, Enge Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Post und den Banken im Bereich des
Plastikgeldes, press release, February 1, 1996.
109 Source: Raffeisenbanken, Cash will dem Münz an den Kragen, Panorama (Die
Kundenzeitschrift der Raffeisenbanken), May 1997.
110 Source: web site of Die Post, consulted on January 16, 2003.
Suerf 4_2004 s poznamkami  12.7.2004  11:28  Stránka 66CASH (Sweden) – Just like its namesake in Switzerland, the CASH scheme
in Sweden uses Proton technology. The original Proton licence was taken out
in March 1996 by Nordbanken (now Nordea) and FöreningsSparbanken
(Swedbank), who were joined in 1997 – that is, after the 1996 pilots in
Uppsala and Halmstad – by S-E Banken (PWI, 1999). According to the first
‘Survey of Electronic Money Developments’ published by the BIS (CPSS,
2000, p. 79), these three banks together had over 70% of the Swedish bank
card market, both as issuers and as acquirers. A fourth bank, Svenska
Handelsbanken, entered the consortium three years later than its peers, in
June 2000 (PWI, 2000). According to ECR (2000b), this meant that the
CASH purse was supported by “90% of the Swedish retail banking sector”.
The second ‘Survey of Electronic Money Developments’talks about “80% of
the Swedish bank card market” (CPSS, 2001, p. 76).
Note that earlier versions of this paper made mention of (much) higher CASH
penetration rates. These were based on figures taken from the PWI web site.
However, on closer scrutiny these figures turned out to suffer from
double-counting, in the sense that whenever a debit card was renewed the new
e-purse id was counted without removing the old e-purse (Source: Geuken,
Fr., personal e-mail, April 4, 2003).
Chipknip (the Netherlands) – The bulk of the Chipknip purses are
incorporated into debit cards (and are thus linked to abank account). However,
on 1 January 2002 Interpay launched the ‘Prepaid Chipknip’– a stand-alone,
disposable card for tourists and people without a bank account
111. This prepaid
card was mainly introduced because a number of municipalities saw the
introduction of the euro as the perfect moment to start collecting parking fees
electronically and do away with cash payment and the associated vandalism
112.
As of 1 January 2002, the use of an e-purse has become compulsory at all
parking meters in the cities of Rotterdam and Nijmegen, and in Purmerend
113.
An important precondition imposed by the new government decree which
made the ‘chip-only’ collection of parking fees possible, was the presence of
sufficient sales points where people could use cash to buy adisposable e-purse.
The Prepaid Chipknips are not included in the figures presented in Figure 1.
Interpay has no data on the number of Prepaid Chipknips used in a particular
period. They only know how much were sold to resellers. In 2002, this number
was 325,000 (Interpay, Annual Report 2002).
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111 Source: Interpay, Parkeren eenvoudig met Chipknip of Chipper, press release, January 10,
2002 <http://www.interpay.nl/content/dynamic.asp?mode=leftmenu&id=1838  >.
112 Source: De Nederlandsche Bank, Current developments in payments and securities
transactions, Quarterly Bulletin, March 2001, p. 26 <http://www.dnb.nl/>.
113 Source: De Nederlandsche Bank, Quarterly Bulletin, March 2002, p. 25.
Suerf 4_2004 s poznamkami  12.7.2004  11:28  Stránka 67The drops in the number of issued cards that are apparent in Figure 1 are
mainly due to data revisions by Interpay (Source: Vergoossen, A., personal
e-mail, February 7, 2003). The increase in the number of cards from April
2002 onwards is due to the demise of the competing Chipper scheme (see
below), and the subsequent replacement of Chipper cards by Chipknip cards.
A final note is that the current Chipknip penetration rate exceeds 100%. This
is because many people in the Netherlands have accounts with more than one
bank.
Chipper (the Netherlands) – This scheme no longer exists. Its history can be
summarized as follows. For more than three years, two groups in the
Netherlands battled for EP supremacy. On one side was the country’s major
phone company, KPN Telecom, and a big retail bank, Postbank, which issued
Chipper cards. On the other side were the rest of the Dutch banks (united in
operator Interpay), which issued the Chipknip EPbased on Proton technology
from Banksys. However, in April 1999 the two schemes eventually signed an
agreement outlining a commitment to ensure interoperability (CPSS, 2000, p.
63). In March 2001, Postbank and ING Bank decided to abandon their
Chipper technology altogether, phase out the Chipper brand, and migrate to
Chipknip by early 2002
114. ING Bank gradually equipped all its bank cards
with a new chip; Postbank opted for a separate Chipknip card next to the
existing debit card
115. On 1 May 2002, merchant acceptance of Chipper cards
came to an end, and on 1 July 2002 Chipper Nederland ceased to exist as an
organisation
116.
Danmønt (Denmark) – This scheme is not included in the graph because the
Danmønt purse is only available as a disposable card so that the figures would
not be comparable with those for other schemes (for which typically all or the
bulk of the cards are reloadable).
Proton (Belgium) – The Proton card was initially available as a stand-alone
card only. It was only at the turn of 1996–1997 that the Belgian banks started
mounting the Proton EP on their debit cards. Note also that the Proton card
was introduced across Belgium in phases. Nation-wide coverage was
achieved at the beginning of 1998.
68 Appendix 2 – Notes to Figures
114 Source: Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken, Banken over op één chiptechnologie, press
release, March 5, 2001 <http://www.nvb.nl/pages/publicaties/persberichten.asp#14>.
115 Source: Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken, Gebruik chipkaarten neemt toe, NVBulletin,
Nr. 1, March 2002, p. 1-3 <http://www.nvb.nl/files/nvbulletin1maart2002.pdf>.
116 Source: Interpay, Chipper is niet meer, Betaalwijzer, Nr. 2, July 2002, p. 11.
Suerf 4_2004 s poznamkami  12.7.2004  11:28  Stránka 68Quick (Austria) – The Quick purse is not only included on bank cards, but
can also be found on ‘Quick-only’cards that are not linked to a bank account,
such as affinity cards issued by drugstore chains. Initially, the relative
importance of this type of cards was limited: at the end of 1996 and 1998
there were respectively 20,000 and 200,000 Quick-only cards in circulation.
However, by the end of 2000 this number had increased to 1,271,000 – thus
accounting for some 50% of the overall growth in the number of cards
between end-1998 and end-2000 (Europay Austria annual reports; Van Hove,
2000, footnote 16). Importantly, however, many holders of affinity cards
never make use of the e-purse function. An interesting example is the ‘BIPA
Best Card’ launched in 2000 by the BIPA drugstore chain. Because the card
was free for customers, many signed up but the vast majority only used it for
the chip-based loyalty scheme. According to Robert Komatz, Product
Manager Pay Before at Europay Austria, “98% of these cards have never been
loaded and used for payment transactions”. It was therefore clear, according
to Komatz, that these cards would not be renewed after expiration. This is
indeed what happened at the end of 2002: some 700,000 cards disappeared
from the statistics. The loyalty scheme is, however, still operational.
Customers can now simply activate the BIPAloyalty scheme on their Maestro
cards. Customers who do not have a Maestro card can obtain a personalized
chip card from BIPA. These cards do not, however, contain the Quick e-purse
because they are only equipped with a low-cost memory chip (Source:
Komatz, R., personal e-mail, January 22, 2003).
Visa Cash (Spain) – According to Carmen Carnero, general deputy manager
Visa España/SERMEPA, the drop in the number of cards between December
2000 and December 2001 is due to “the imminent migration to EMV + CEPS.
Financial institutions are cleaning up their portfolios to get ready for the
migration process” (Source: Carnero, C., personal e-mail, September 12,
2002).
Figure 2 – Number of activated cards
See main text for the definitions used by the respective schemes.
Proton (Belgium) – The decrease in the number of activated Proton cards
during 1999 is a statistical anomaly which is due to the fact that Banksys
revised its calculations.
Figure 3 – Number of active cards
See main text for the definitions used by the respective schemes.
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In principle, the figures relate to active terminals; that is, terminals which
have performed at least one transaction.
CASH (Sweden) – The sudden drop in the number of CASH terminals
between March and April 2002 is due to the removal of inactive terminals
(Source: Geuken, Fr., personal e-mail, April 17, 2003).
Euro 6000 (Spain) – Figures relate to the Euro 6000 network alone even
though CECAhas an agreement with Sistema 4B about Euro 6000-Monedero
4B interoperability for purchase transactions (not for loading transactions)
117.
However, I have no data on the number of Monedero 4B terminals. Also, “the
number of interchange operations is less than 1 percent of the total”
118.
Just like the Visa Cash card (and the Monedero 4B, for that matter), the Euro
6000 purse is accepted as a payment method by Canal Satélite Digital
119.
These set-top boxes are not included in the figures presented in Figure 4.
According to Antonio de Andrés Turrión, the number of transactions is low:
“We have less than 1,000 transactions per month and there are about 2 million
set-top boxes”
120.
GeldKarte (Germany) – Figures were taken from the S-CARD website and
relate to active terminals. This explains why the figures are lower than those
reported by the Bundesbank. All data are quarterly data (average over period)
– except for the observation for July 2003 – and are presented as an
observation for the final month of the quarter.
Visa Cash (Spain) – Prior to 2002, terminals include Teléfonica’s public
phone booths (see main text). Today, more than 25 universities have Visa
Cash programs as have 8 local transportation companies (mainly in city
buses). Since July 2000, Visa Cash cards are accepted at all 1,8 million Canal
Satélite Digital set-top boxes to pay for pay-per-view programs (Carnero,
2002a and 2002b). These set-top boxes are, however, not included in the
figures presented in Figure 4 as this would distort the overall picture.
70 Appendix 2 – Notes to Figures
117 Fernandez Caro, S., Visa y 4B se unen para dar un nuevo impulso al monedero electronico,
Noticias de Bolsa de Madrid, July 12, 1998.
118 Source: de Andrés Turrión, A., personal e-mail, September 4, 2002.
119 Source: Chip and credit cards will be able to be used with Canal Satélite decoder, El Pais
Digital, December 22, 1999 <http://www.intelligentdata.es/news/22-12-99-1.html>.
120 Source: de Andrés Turrión, A., personal e-mail, September 18, 2002.
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CASH (Switzerland) – The transactions data for 2001–2002 were quarterly
data which I converted into monthly figures (for the final month of the
quarter).
Chipknip (the Netherlands) – Usage figures are biased upward because
Prepaid Chipknips are not included in the card figures.
Figure 6 – Frequency of use, activated cards
See main text for the definitions of ‘activated card’ used by the respective
schemes.
Figure 7 – Float
CASH (Sweden) – According to Mr. Geuken, the drop in the float in
May–September 2002 is a statistical anomaly due to the introduction of a new
release of the Proton Host System in April 2002 (Source: Geuken, Fr.,
personal e-mail, April 17, 2003).
Figure 8 – Number of transactions
CASH (Switzerland) – As in Figure 5, quarterly data have been converted
into monthly observations.
Chipper (the Netherlands) – As is apparent from the lack of variability,
yearly figures were used here.
Danmønt (Denmark) – Based on quarterly data.
Moneo (France) – The figures for January–May 2003 are averages.
Visa Cash (Spain) – The Visa Cash transaction data provided by SERMEPA
were quarterly data, which I converted into monthly data. However, since
both the number and value of transactions remained virtually constant
throughout the period covered, the conversion should entail only minor
distortions.
Quick (Austria) – The figures for November–December
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Société Universitaire Européenne de Recherches Financières 
SUERF is incorporated in France as a non-profit-making Association. It was
founded in 1963 as a European-wide forum with the aim of bringing together
professionals from both the practitioner and academic sides of finance who
have an interest in the working of financial markets, institutions and systems,
and the conduct of monetary and regulatory policy.
SUERF is a network association of central bankers, bankers and other
practitioners in the financial sector, and academics with the purpose of
analysing and understanding European financial markets, institutions and
systems, and the conduct of regulation and monetary policy. It organises
regular Colloquia, lectures and seminars and each year publishes several
analytical studies in the form of SUERF Studies.
SUERF has its full-time permanent Executive Office and Secretariat located
at the Austrian National Bank in Vienna. It is financed by annual corporate,
personal and academic institution membership fees. Corporate membership
currently includes major European financial institutions and Central Banks.
SUERF is strongly supported by Central Banks in Europe and its membership
comprises most of Europe’s Central Banks (29 in total, including the Bank for
International Settlements and the European Central Bank), banks, other
financial institutions and academics.
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1997 – 2002
1. G.M.M. Gelauff and C. den Broeder, Governance of Stakeholder
relationships; The German and Dutch experience, Amsterdam, 1997,
ISBN 90-5143-024-8.
2. Rolf Skog, Does Sweden need a Mandatory Bid Rule, a critical analysis,
Amsterdam 1997, ISBN 90-5143-025-6.
3. Corporate Governance in Central and Eastern Europe; Transition
Management is a Tough Job. Two papers. Amsterdam, 1998, 
ISBN 90-5143-027-2.
1) Debora Revoltella, Financing Firms in East European Countries: An
Asymmetric Information and Agency Costs Approach
2) Peter H. Haiss and Gerhard Fink, Seven Years of Financial Market
Reform in Central Europe
4. Joseph Bisignano, Towards an Understanding of the Changing Structure
of Financial Intermediation; An Evolutionary Theory of Institutional
Survival, Amsterdam, 1998, ISBN 90-5143-026-4. (out of print)
5. David T. Llewellyn, The New Economics of Banking, Amsterdam, 1999,
ISBN 90-5143-028-0.
6. John Calverley, Sarah Hewin, Kevin Grice, Emerging Stock Markets
after the Crisis, Amsterdam, 2000, ISBN 90-5143-029-9.
7. Strengthening Financial Infrastructure: Deposit Insurance and Lending of
Last Resort (two contributions), Amsterdam, 2000, ISBN 90-5143-030-2.
1) Richard Dale, Deposit Insurance in Theory and Practice
2) Christian de Boissieu and Franco Bruni, Lending of Last Resort and
Systemic Stability in the Eurozone.
8. Cem Karacadag and Michael W. Taylor, The New Capital Adequacy
Framework: Institutional Constraints and Incentive Structures, Vienna,
2000, ISBN 3-902109-00-9.
9. Miguel Sebastián and Carmen Hernansanz, The Spanish Banks’
Strategy in Latin America, Vienna, 2000, ISBN 3-902109-01-7.
10. M.M.G. Fase and W.F.V. Vanthoor, The Federal Reserve System
Discussed: AComparative Analysis, Vienna, 2000, ISBN 3-902109-02-5.
11. Willem H. Buiter and Clemens Grafe, Central Banking and the Choice
of Currency Regime in Accession Countries, Vienna, 2001, 
ISBN 3-902-109-03-3.
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Financing, Capital Structure, and Ownership: A Survey, and Implications
for Developing Economies, Vienna, 2001, ISBN 3-902109-04-1.
13. Martin M.G. Fase, Investment in Paintings: The interaction of monetary
return and psychic income, Vienna, 2001, ISBN 3-902109-05-X.
14. Alexandre Lamfalussy, Reflections on the Regulation of European
Securities Markets, Vienna 2001, ISBN 3-902109-06-8.
15. Italian Mutual Banks: Performance, Efficiency and Mergers and
Acquisitions (two contributions), Vienna 2002, ISBN 3-902109-07-6.
1) Juan Sergio Lopez, Alessandra Appennini, Stefania P.S. Rossi,
Evidence from two different cost frontier techniques.
2) Roberto Di Salvo, Maria Carmela Mazzilis, Andrea Guidi,
Mergers and acquisitions between mutual banks in Italy: an analysis of
the effects on performance and productive efficiency.
16. Thomas Reininger, Franz Schardax, Martin Summer, Financial
System Transition in Central Europe: The First Decade, Vienna, 2002,
ISBN 3-902109-08-4.
17. Helmut Wagner, Implications of Globalization for Monetary Policy,
Vienna, 2002, ISBN 3-902109-09-2.
18. Luiz Fernando De Paula, Banking Internationalisation and the
Expansion Strategies of European Banks to Brazil during the 1990s,
Vienna, 2002, ISBN 3-902109-10-6.
19. Is there a Future for Regional Banks and Regional Exchanges? The
Strategies of Selected Austrian Finance Institutions, (four contributions),
Vienna, 2002, ISBN 3-902109-11-4.
1) David T. Llewellyn, The Future for Small & Regional Banks
inEurope
2) Reinhard Ortner, What Future for Regional Banks?
3) Herbert Stepic, The Strategy of RZB in Central and Eastern Europe
4) Stefan K. Zapotocky, The Challenges and Chances of Regional
Exchanges
20. Thomas Dalsgaard, Jorgen Elmeskov, Cyn-Young Park, Ongoing
Changes in the Business Cycle – Evidence and Causes, Vienna, 2002,
ISBN 3-902109-12-2.
21. Christian Harm, Bank Management Between Shareholders and
Regulators, Vienna, 2002, ISBN 3-902109-13-0.
22. Jean-Paul Abraham, Peter van Dijcke, European Financial
Cross-Border Consolidation: At the Crossroads in Europe? By Exception,
Evolution or Revolution, Vienna, 2002, ISBN 3-902109-14-9.
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2003/1 Bert Scholtens, Dick van Wensveen, The Theory of Financial
Intermediation: An Essay on What it Does (Not) Explain, Vienna 2003,
ISBN 3-902109-15-7.
2003/2 Paola Bongini, The EU Experience in Financial Services
Liberalization: A Model for GATS Negotiation? Vienna 2003, 
ISBN 3-902109-16-5.
2003/3 Jean-Paul Abraham, Introduction by David T. Llewellyn,
Monetary and Financial Thinking in Europe – Evidence from Four
Decades of SUERF, Vienna 2003, ISBN 3-902109-17-3.
2003/4 Securing Financial Stability: Problems and Prospects for New EU
Members (three papers) Introduction by Morten Balling, Vienna 2003,
ISBN 3-902109-18-1
1) Michael C. Bonello, Stability Oriented Monetary and Prudential
Policies in EU Accession Countries
2) Fabrizio Saccomanni, Ensuring Financial Stability: Global and
European Perspectives
3) Claudia M. Buch, Jörn Kleinert and Peter Zajc, Foreign Bank
Ownership: A Bonus or Threat for Financial Stability?
2003/5 Ralph Süppel, Russia’s Financial Markets Boom, Crisis and
Recovery 1995-2001, Vienna 2003, ISBN 3-902109-19-X
2004
2004/1 Supervisory Systems, Fiscal Soundness and International Capital
Movement: More Challenges for new EU Members (three papers)
Introduction by Morten Balling, Vienna 2004, ISBN 3-902109-20-3
1) Andreas Grünbichler and Patrick Darlap, Integration of European
Supervisory Systems: Harmonisation or Unification?
2) Sinikka Salo, The Relevance of Fiscal Soundness for Monetary Stability
3) Leslie Lipschitz, Timothy Lane and Alex Mourmouras, How Capital
Flowswill influence the EU Accession Countires of Central and Eastern
Europe
2004/2 European Monetary and Financial Integration: Evolution and
Prospects (five speeches), Introduction by Eduard H Hochreiter and
David T Llewellyn, Vienna 2004, ISBN 3-902109-21-1
1) Monetary and Financial Thinking in Europe since the Sixties:
Evidence from the SUERF Colloquia. By Jean-Paul Abraham
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By Franco Bruni
3) Financial Globalisation and Financial Market Integration in Europe:
Challenges Ahead for the European System of Central Banks,
by Baron Alexandre Lamfalussy
4) How to complete the Integration of the European Financial Market,
by Robert Raymond
5) Optimal Currency Areas and Implementation of Economic Policies,
by Jean-Claude Trichet
2004/3 Northern and Eastern Enlargement of EMU: Do Structural Reforms
Matter? By Andrew Hughes Hallett, Svend E. Hougaard Jensen and
Christian Richter, Vienna 2004, ISBN 3-902109-22-X
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